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NOTE
IN SEARCH OF A SMOKING GUN: A COMPARISON
OF PUBLIC ENTITY TOBACCO AND GUN
LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw the birth of mass tort
litigation in the form of class action lawsuits. These lawsuits
allowed courts to consolidate multiple claims into one courtroom for faster and more manageable adjudication. The early
cases involved single-accident torts, such as lawsuits brought
to recover for deaths and injuries resulting from building fires
or collapses.' The 1980s and early 1990s saw the emergence of
dispersed mass torts, such as lawsuits brought to recover for
injuries resulting from exposure to Agent Orange or silicone
breast implants.2 In the late 1990s, a new form of dispersed
mass tort arrived: lawsuits brought by cities, counties, states,
or the federal government (i.e., public entities) to recover the
costs of government expenditures allegedly resulting, directly
or indirectly, from the conduct of the tobacco and handgun
industries.
Beginning in 1994, forty-eight states filed suit against the
tobacco industry. Soon after that litigation was concluded by a
national settlement, public entities across the country began
filing lawsuits against the gun industry.3 These public entity
lawsuits are comparable in many respects. First, the plaintiffs
have mostly been unsuccessful in holding the industries liable
See Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1977); In re Fed. Skywalk
Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1982); see also Alfred W. Cortesi, Jr. & James C.
Wilson, Sentence First, Verdict Afterwards; The Crisis of Mass Torts, BRIEFLY ...
Feb. 1997, at 21. For an excellent history of mass tort litigation, see generally
Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993).
See generally In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718
(E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 92-P10000-S, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21236 (N.D. Ala. June 1, 1993).
' See infra note 136.
1
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for the damages they allegedly caused. Second, the ends sought
by the public entities in their litigation against the industries
are the same as are many of the claims. Finally, the level of
public animosity towards both industries is very high.
The tobacco and gun litigations are similar because the
plaintiffs have similar goals. The Attorneys General who sued
the tobacco industry acted out of frustration with the lack of
political initiative to address the public health crisis allegedly
caused by the tobacco industry.4 The states' goals were to recoup huge Medicaid expenses paid by the states' taxpayers and
to force the tobacco industry to reform its marketing and distribution methods.' The Attorneys General crafted their claims
against the tobacco industry by suing for damages allegedly
suffered by the states themselves, thus circumventing the need
to prove individual causation.
Similarly, public entities are suing the gun industry because of the failure of individual and class action lawsuits and
legislation to accomplish comprehensive gun reform. The public
entities' goals are to expose the gun industry's allegedly reckless marketing and distribution practices, to recover at least a
portion of the public costs caused by gun violence, and to force
the industry to change many of its products' design features.6
Following the states' example in the tobacco litigation, the
public entities that have filed suit against the gun manufacturers are also attempting to sue for damages suffered by the
cities directly. In sum, the public entity tobacco litigation has
served as a blueprint for the highly coordinated gun litigation.7

See infra Part I.B. The Attorneys General were spurred into action in many
states by "entrepreneurial trial lawyers who had become frustrated at their lack of
success in persuading juries to award damages to people who had developed smoking-related illnesses." Richard Tomkins, Opening the Floodgates, FINANcIAL TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1998, at 17.
' See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in
the Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 63,
63 (1997).
6 See infra Part II.
7 See infra Part II.C.1.
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Despite the questionable merits of the public entity tobacco lawsuits,8 the tobacco companies agreed to settle without
trying a single case to verdict. The most likely result in the
public entity gun litigation is also a settlement, thus achieving
the type of industry-wide reform through litigation that has
not been achieved through legislation.
This Note concludes that the public entity tobacco and
handgun lawsuits, while not technically class action lawsuits,
have the same characteristics as those class action lawsuits
that have raised questions about the validity of national mass
tort class action litigation.' Namely, the public entity lawsuits
have the potential for huge variations in liability and damages
which can force entire industries to settle. The settlement
pressure is so great that the lawsuits basically amount to legalized blackmail." Further, this Note argues that the public
entity lawsuits constitute an abuse of the judicial process in an
attempt to usurp what should be a legislative decision-making
process. The public entities' choice of litigation rather than
legislation is an inefficient and inappropriate means of regulating gun and tobacco production and distribution, and it implicates concerns about the democratic process." Finally, the
public entity litigation defeats two of the central purposes of
See infra Part I.D.
Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on
Mass Torts to the Chief Justice of the United States and to the Judicial Conference of the United States at 36 (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Report of the Advisory
Committee]; see also Symposium, The Federalist Society: Conference: Civil Justice
and the Litigation Process: Do the Merits and the Search for Truth Matter Anymore? 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 337, 338 (1997) [hereinafter Symposium]; FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a) (1996 amendment to advisory committee's notes).
"o Symposium, supra note 9, at 350 n.30. The term "legalized blackmail" was
used by Sheila Birnbaum to describe class action lawsuits that force settlement
and was originally used by Milton Handler in describing antitrust class action
lawsuits that force settlement. Symposium, supra note 9, at 350 n.30; see also Report of the Advisory Committe, supra note 9, at 20 (asserting that aggregation of a massive number of claims through class certification can create an "all or
nothing risk" that forces companies to either settle or risk bankruptcy"); Castano
v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (same).
" See Robert A. Levy, Tobacco Medicaid Litigation: Snuffing Out the Rule of
Law, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 601 (Spring, 1998). "We are dealing here with moral, political, and legal questions that transcend any single industry. What's at stake is
nothing less than our principle of individual responsibility, our choice between
legislation and adjudication, and our constitutional right to due process-in short,
the rule of law." Id. at 602.
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tort law-to spread risk through insurance coverage and to
compensate specific victims for damages suffered as a result of
another's conduct.
Part I summarizes the public entity tobacco litigation and
settlement, including the states' specific claims, analyzes the
indications for the success or failure of the state lawsuits had
they been tried, and discusses the policy implications of the
settlement. Part II summarizes the public entity gun litigation,
including the specific claims in the city and county lawsuits,
analyzes the merits of these claims, and discusses the policy
implications of the litigation.
I.

STATE TOBACCO LITIGATION

A. Background
The forty-eight states that filed suit against the tobacco
industry were operating on the premise that they would attempt to induce industry-wide reform of the tobacco industry
because state and federal governments had failed to do so.12
In order to induce such reforms, the Attorneys General of the
forty-eight states alleged that new information about the tobacco industry supported several novel products liability and other
tort claims against the tobacco companies. Ultimately, none of
the state tobacco lawsuits were tried to verdict. Instead, they
resulted in several agreements that provided for payments to
the states and accomplished some of the Attorneys General's
regulatory objectives. 3
The settlement process began in March, 1996, when one of
the defendant tobacco companies, the Brooke Group, Ltd., and
its tobacco division, Liggett, broke rank from the other tobacco
companies and settled with five states and sixty-seven law
12 The state lawsuits followed decades of unsuccessful litigation by individual
and class action plaintiffs. During the first wave of litigation, 1954 to 1973, the
theories of liability were primarily theories of deceit, breach of express and implied
warranty, and negligence, and were filed by individual plaintiffs. During the second wave of litigation, 1983 to 1992, individual plaintiffs added theories of failure
to warn and strict liability. During the first wave, the tobacco industry's best
defense was lack of scientific information and during the second wave it was assumption of risk and contributory negligence. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5,
at 71.
13

See CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE V. BIG TOBACCO 253 (1998).
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firms that were suing the industry. 4 It was the first such
agreement in forty years of tobacco litigation. I" The Liggett
settlement spurred on negotiations between the remaining
defendant tobacco companies and the Attorneys General of the
states that had filed suit. One year later, Liggett settled with
twenty more states and agreed to release allegedly damaging
tobacco industry documents. 6 A few weeks after that settlement was announced, the first meeting between a plaintiffs attorney and tobacco company attorneys took place. 7
On April 3, 1997, Philip Morris's chief executive, Geoff
Bible; R.J. Reynold's chief executive, Steven Goldstone; and
their respective attorneys met with several state Attorneys
General to discuss an agreement. 8 Two months later in
Washington, D.C., the tobacco companies and Attorneys General announced a multi-billion dollar "National Settlement." 9
The National Settlement had to be codified by congressional
legislation to bind all of the states to settlement provisions
regarding federal jurisdiction over nicotine contained in tobacco products." The Senate debated the language and substance
of the Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, and modified the bill
repeatedly.2 In light of the modifications, the tobacco companies withdrew their support for the process of codifying the
National Settlement as tobacco legislation.2 2
On November 23, 1998, forty-six states, five commonwealths and territories, and the District of Columbia entered
into a twenty-five year, $206 billion Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA")' with Philip Morris, Inc., Brown & Williamson

14

See id.

' See id.
, See id.
,' See id. at 254.

, See MOLLENKAIP ET AL., supra note 13, at 254.
"

See id.

2' See Graham Kelder et al., The Proposed Tobacco Settlement, TOBACCO CONTROL UPDATE, 1997b (1.3-4), at 5.
21 S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1998). The Act was sponsored by Commerce
Chairman
John McCain (R-AZ). Id.
2 See Graham Kelder, Tobacco Pact Moves Forward: President Clinton Enunciates Principles for Comprehensive Legislation on Tobacco as Divergent Coalitions
Form and Legislation is Introduced in Congress Codifying the National Settlement,
TOBACCO CONTROL UPDATE, 1997a (2.1), at 4.
" For the full text of the MSA, see Tobacco Control Resource Center, Inc. &
The Tobacco Products Liability Project, at http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/Extra/multi-
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Tobacco Corp., Lorillard Tobacco Corp., and R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co.24 The tobacco companies were required to pay a
$10 billion lump sum cash payment up front, and then to make
base annual payments for twenty-five years, subject to inflation protection and volume adjustments (the "Industry Payments")Y From the Industry Payments, an aggressive federal
enforcement program would be created, including a state-administered retail licensing system to stop minors from obtaining tobacco products. Enforcement of federal restrictions on
smoking in public places would be funded from the Industry
Payments, as would a $500 million annual, national educationoriented counter-advertising and tobacco control campaign
seeking to discourage children from starting to smoke and to
encourage current smokers to quit smoking. The agreement
also authorized the annual payment to all states of significant,
ongoing financial compensation from Industry Payments to
fund health benefits program expenditures and to establish
and fund a tobacco products liability judgments and settlement
fund.2 6 In addition, the tobacco companies agreed to go beyond current regulations to ban all outdoor advertising and to
eliminate cartoon characters and human figures such as Joe
Camel and the Marlboro Man from advertisements.
Prior to the MSA, four states had settled individually with
the tobacco companies. In 1997, Mississippi settled for $3.3
billion over twenty-five years, as did Florida for $11 billion
over twenty-five years. In 1998, Texas settled for $14.5 billion
state_settlement.htm (last modified Nov. 22, 2000).
24 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, at 291.
' See id. at 291-92.
26 See id. at 268-69. A legal fight is emerging in several of the states slated to
receive part of the settlement. Lawyers in Georgia, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia are preparing to file coordinated class action lawsuits maintaining that under federal Medicaid law, any settlement to the states above the amount they paid through Medicaid for treatment of smoking-related diseases should go to the Medicaid recipients.
None of the states that were party to the settlement plan any form of payment
directly to afflicted smokers. Many of the states have begun using the money less
for smoking-related programs than for initiatives like tax cuts and construction of
roads and bridges. In response to these lawsuits, the states are claiming sovereign
immunity and maintaining that the settlement was not intended to reimburse
them from Medicaid expenses, but instead to resolve claims of antitrust, consumer
fraud, and RICO violations. Stephen Labatan, Medicaid Smokers Seek to Gain a
Share of States' Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2000, at All.
27 See MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, at 268.
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over twenty-five years, as did Minnesota for $6.5 billion over
twenty-five years. 8
The MSA did not end the tobacco industry's litigation
troubles. In 1999, the Justice Department filed suit against the
tobacco industry. In addition, numerous individual and class
action lawsuits have been filed against the tobacco industry before and after the MSA.3"
B. State Claims, Generally
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi Attorney General Mike
Moore filed a lawsuit seeking to recover $940 million from the
2 See Laura Hermer, Executive Summary, in THE TOBACCO CONTROL RESOURCE

CENTER, INC., THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE
OF STATE AND LOCAL TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TOPICS AND
PROVISIONS OF THE MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER
23, 1998 at 5, available at Tobacco Control Resource Center, Inc. & The Tobacco
Products Liability Project, http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/msa/index.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2001).
21 On September 22, 1999, the federal government filed suit against the tobacco
industry in federal court. The lawsuit alleges that cigarette companies have conspired since the 1950's to defraud and mislead the American public and to conceal
information about the effects of smoking in violation of RICO. According to Assistant Attorney General David Ogden, "[tihe federal government now spends an
estimated $22 billion each year on smoking-related illnesses. More than half of it
is paid by Medicare. For too long, these costs have been unfairly borne by U.S.
taxpayers. Tobacco companies must be held accountable for the death, disease, and
economic burdens caused by their products." Michael J. Sniffen, Justice Department
Sues Tobacco Companies, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 22, 1999, available at
http://www.star-telegram.com/news/doc/1047/i:FRONT37/1:FRONT37092299.html (last
visited Feb. 19, 2001).
On June 24, 2000, by a vote of 215 to 183, the House of Representatives
approved an amendment that allows the Justice Department to receive $12 million
from the Departments of Defense, Veteran Affairs, and Health and Human Services to support the lawsuit. Attorney General Janet Reno publicly stated that without the money from other agencies, the Justice Department may not have been
able to advance the lawsuit. See Steven A. Holmes, A Vote to Aid Justice Dept. in
Tobacco Suit, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2000, at A12.
0 The most notable lawsuit against the tobacco industry, Engle v. Philip Morris, resulted in a huge win for a class action in Miami-Dade County, Florida. In
July, 1999, the jury found that the tobacco industry manufactured a deadly product and that it had deceived the public for years. The jury awarded the plaintiffs
$12.7 million in compensatory damages. Following the punitive damages phase of
the trial, the same jury awarded $144.8 billion to the 500,000 Florida smokers in
the class. See Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22 at 27-28 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. 11th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000), available at Tobacco Control Resource Center, Inc.
& The Tobacco Products Liability Project, http://www.tobacco.neu.edu/ExtraEngle
(last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
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tobacco industry that he claimed the state had spent treating
sick smokers. 1 Moore was the first Attorney General to file
suit, but forty-seven other Attorneys General were soon to
follow. Moore's theory was that tobacco products and promotions should be heavily regulated to promote public health.
Moore believed that the lack of tobacco regulation3 2 stemmed,
in large part, from the tobacco industry's use of its financial
might to aggressively oppose regulation of cigarette design and
manufacture.33 The failure of state and federal legislatures
and administrative agencies to regulate the manufacture of
tobacco products led Moore to conclude that products liability
litigation was the most promising means of controlling the sale
and use of tobacco. 4 The other forty-seven states that filed
suit against the tobacco industry shared Moore's purpose and
strategy.

"' See generally Complaint, Moore v. The American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429
(Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County filed May 23, 1994), available at The State Tobacco
Information Center, http://www.stic.neu.edu/MS/MSTOC.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2001).
32 The tobacco industry is not entirely unregulated. In 1964, the Surgeon
General's Advisory Committee issued a report linking smoking to a number of
diseases. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEATH & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH:
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC
HEALTH SERvICE 31 (1964). That report led Congress to pass the Federal Cigarette
Labeling Act, by which Congress sought to inform the public as to the various
health hazards associated with smoking cigarettes. 15 U.S.C. §1331 (2000). This
Act was amended by the 1969 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which required the use of the word "dangerous" in cigarette labels and banned advertising
of cigarettes on any electronic medium. Pub. L. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87, as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340.
" The tobacco industry does contribute heavily to political campaigns. Total
'soft money" contributions, which are not subject to federal limits, reached close to
$2.3 million in 1995. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 68. However, plaintiffs
lawyers are not exactly political lightweights. In fact, Vice President Gore and the
Democratic party collect "big contributions" from trial lawyers. Adam Cohen, Are
Lawyers Running America?, TIME, July 17, 2000, at 23. Following the disbursement of legal fees from the tobacco settlement, approximately 100 of the plaintiffs
law firms involved will get about $10 billion. See id. Who knows what portion of
those billions will be dedicated to lobbying efforts opposing tort reform.
" See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 63. Some legislation has had the
effect of helping the tobacco industry defend itself against individual plaintiffs'
claims. The government-mandated inclusion of warning labels on each pack of cigarettes (15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340) foreclosed any claim that the tobacco industry had
failed to warn consumers about the dangers of tobacco products. See Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
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During the "third wave" of lawsuits against the tobacco
industry, the Attorneys General introduced several new claims.
The two main claims underlying the liability theories in the
state lawsuits were: (1) The tobacco companies knew, but long
hid, their knowledge that nicotine is pharmacologically active
and highly addictive; and (2) The tobacco companies manipulated nicotine levels in their products to hook unsuspecting
smokers."
More specifically, the states alleged that the tobacco companies had engaged in a long history of misrepresentations
about the health hazards of tobacco beginning in the 1930s.
The states claimed that the tobacco companies had known for
nearly sixty years that smoking caused cancer, coronary heart
disease, emphysema, and stroke, and that the defendants had
conspired to suppress that scientific information so that it
would not reach the public.3 6 The states asserted that, following the initial "Big Scare" in 1953 about tobacco causing cancer, the defendants created the Tobacco Industry Research
Committee to manipulate information about tobacco-related research." The states further alleged that the defendants had
promised to conduct valid research and honestly report the
results in 1954, but had breached those promises and have
continued to do so for nearly fifty years. 8
One of the more ingenious aspects of the states' lawsuits
against the tobacco industry was that they effectively forestalled the use of the tobacco industry's most successful defenses. The defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence might not have been available to tobacco companies in
medical cost reimbursement lawsuits because the states were
not suing on behalf of injured smokers; rather, they were suing
on behalf of the states themselves to recover medical costs that
they were forced to pay to care for indigent smokers on Medicaid. The theory was that the tobacco industry could not plausibly argue that the states chose to smoke or that the states
contributed to the financial harm caused to them. 9 In addition, the Attorneys General's strategy was to decouple the

k
'

See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 72.
See Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris, 577 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Iowa 1998).
See id.

' See

id.

See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 82-83.
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states' rights to recover from the expensive, time-consuming
requirement of proving causation and damages for each smoker, relying instead on statistical information.40
C. State Claims, Specifically
The following sample of cases cover the range of novel
claims lodged against the tobacco industry by states across the
country.
1. Unjust Enrichment and Restitution 4
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi filed a lawsuit claiming that
the tobacco industry should be forced to reimburse the state's
taxpayers for the state's share of Medicaid costs created by
treatment of tobacco-related diseases. Rather than proceeding
on a theory of subrogation, Mississippi's Attorney General
chose to proceed in equity. His equitable theories of unjust
enrichment and restitution were grounded in the notion that
the state had been injured directly by the tobacco industry's
behavior because the state had been forced to confer a benefit
on the tobacco industry by paying Medicaid costs associated
with tobacco-related illnesses.4 2 The unjust enrichment and
restitution theory of liability had three elements: (1) the tobacco industry knowingly created a massive public health crisis,
(2) the State, as guardian of the public health, acted to meet

41 See

Al.

Bob Van Voris, AG's Claims Mere Smoke?, NATL L.J., Apr. 28, 1997, at

"' The doctrine that the commission of a tort results in the unjust enrichment
of the defendant at the plaintiffs expense has developed out of the common law
procedure of assumpsit. "The plaintiff may disregard, or 'waive,' the tort action,
and sue instead on a theoretical and fictitious contract for restitution of the
benefits which the defendant has so received." WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE
KEETON, LAW ON TORTS 672 (5th ed. 1984). Restitution "looks to what the
defendant has received which in good conscience should belong to the plaintiff; and
this may be either more or less than the amount of the plaintiffs actual loss." Id.
at 672-73. Restitution is restricted to those cases in which "the wrongdoer has
been unjustly enriched by his commission of a tort and is 'under an obligation
from the ties of natural justice' to repay it." Id. at 673 (citations omitted).
42 See Complaint at 91 2, 40, Mississippi v. The Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94:1429
(Miss. Ch. Ct. Jackson County filed May 23, 1994), available at The State Tobacco
Information Center, http'//www.stic.neu.edu/MS/MSTOC.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2001).

20001

PUBLIC ENTITY TOBACCO AND GUN LAWSUITS

that crisis through the provision of necessary medical treatment, and (3) in fulfilling that duty, the State assumed a
crushing financial burden which, in all equity and fairness,
should be borne by the tobacco companies. 4
2. Public Nuisance"
Section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects
the broad power of the state to protect the public from activities that are an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.45 Several states argued that, inasmuch as health is a right common to the general public, the
state should have a right to prevent the tobacco companies
from further interfering with that right by negligently marketing and distributing tobacco products. These states argued that
they had been damaged by abating, through the Medicaid
program, a health hazard created by the tobacco companies.4 6
3.

Antitrust Violation, Conspiracy, and Consumer Fraud

Minnesota filed suit on August 17, 1994, and Blue CrossBlue Shield joined as a co-plaintiff seeking reimbursement for
its alleged share of tobacco-related health care costs.4 7
Minnesota's Attorney General sued under theories of antitrust
violations, conspiracy, and consumer fraud, claiming that the

' See Jonathan S. Massey, Commentary of Florida's 1994 Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act: The Florida Tobacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objections to a Reasonable Solution to Florida's Medicaid Crisis, 46 FLA. L. REV. 591, 596 (1995).
"' To be considered public, the nuisance must affect an interest common to the
general public, rather than peculiar to one individual, or even several. It is not
necessary, however, that the entire community be affected, so long as the nuisance
will interfere with those who come in contact with it in the exercise of public
rights. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, at 605-7.

" A public nuisance is defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as "an
unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1). A public right is one common to all
members of the public. See id. § 821B(g).
" See Massey, supra note 43, at 601.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that Blue CrossBlue Shield had the necessary interest in this matter to pursue its statutory and
common law antitrust and consumer claims as well as its equitable claims, but
not on its tort theory. "While we believe that Blue Cross has been injured, we
conclude that the injury . . . is simply too remote." Minnesota v. Philip Morris,
551 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn. 1996).
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tobacco industry undertook a special duty to inform consumers
of the dangers inherent in tobacco products.48 At the heart of
Minnesota's claims was the theory that the tobacco companies
illegally conspired both to suppress research on the deleterious
effects of smoking and to manipulate nicotine levels in cigarettes in order to induce addiction. The State also alleged that
the tobacco industry undertook a duty to protect the public
health by asserting that it would cooperate with public health
authorities and by accepting the preservation of public health
as a basic industry responsibility.4 9
4. Products Liability-Abnormally Dangerous Activity"
West Virginia filed suit on September 20, 1994, claiming
that tobacco companies intentionally manufactured and sold
numerous brands of defective, unreasonably dangerous, and
hazardous products.5 1

" See generally Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Minnesota v. Philip
Morris, CI-94-8565 (2d Dist. Minn. Ramsey County filed Jan. 6, 1998), available at
The State Tobacco Information Center, http://www.stic.neu.edu/MN/MNTOC.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
4 See Minnesota v. Philip Morris, 551 N.W.2d at 493-94.
The doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities grew qut of
an English case, Rylands v. Fletcher. 1865, 3 H. & C. 774. The rule that emerged
from English decisions is that "the defendant will be liable when he damages
another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place
where it is maintained, in the light of the character of that place and its
surroundings." This rule has been rejected by a few American jurisdictions, but
accepted by the majority. The American decisions, like the English ones, have
applied the principle only to the thing out of place, the abnormally dangerous
condition or activity which is not a "natural" one where it is. The Restatement of
Torts has accepted the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, but has limited it to an
"ultrahazardous activity" of the defendant, defined as one which "necessarily
involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care, and is not a matter of
common usage." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, at 519-27.
" See generally Complaint, West Virginia v. The Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-1707
(Cir. Ct. Kanawha County filed Sept. 20, 1994), available at The State Tobacco
Information Center, http://www.stic.neu.edu/WV/WVTOC.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2001).
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5. Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act
Only one state codified its novel attack against the tobacco
industry.12 Until 1994, in lawsuits to recover Medicaid expenses, Florida was statutorily limited to traditional notions of
subrogation, assignment, and lien. Under any of those theories,
Florida would have been subject to the same legal obstacles
that a Medicaid recipient would face in pursuing a claim. In
1994, however, with the amended Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act (the "Florida Act"),53 Florida created an independent
cause of action for itself to which traditional affirmative defenses would not apply. 4 The effects of the 1994 modifications
to the Florida Act were to (1) restate and expand its language
indicating that all affirmative defenses be abrogated to the
extent necessary to ensure the State's recovery; (2) relieve the
State of any duty to identify individual recipients of Medicaid
payments; (3) abrogate the statute of repose defense; (4) authorize the State to pursue all of its claims in one proceeding; (5)
authorize the State to utilize theories of market share liability
in conjunction with a theory of joint and several liability; and
(6) authorize the State to use statistical analysis in proving
causation and damages. 5
In a 5-4 decision, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
Florida Act, but with two significant caveats. First, the facial
constitutionality ruling does not preclude a later action challenging the manner in which the Florida Act is applied.5 6 Second, the essential components of the Florida Act are constitutional, but a few provisions must be modified or57 the Florida
Act would be stricken as violative of Due Process.
62See Levy, supra note 11, at 605.
r3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 1994).
' Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239,

1249, 1258 (Fla., 1996).
Id. at 1249-50.
See id. at 1253.
17See id. at 1248. The court held that the provision granting the State authority to pursue an action without identifying individual Medicaid recipients must be
stricken because it encroaches on Due Process rights. Specifically, it would preclude a defendant from challenging improper payments made to individual recipients and from proving that his product was not used by the recipient. See id. at
1253-54. The court held that the portion of the Act that abolished the statute of
repose defense was unconstitutional because once an action is barred, a property
right to be free from a claim has accrued. See Agency for Heath Care Admin., 678
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D. Indicationsfor Success or Failureat Trial
There are several reasons to think that the state lawsuits
would not have been as successful as the settlement in reforming the tobacco industry. Conversely, there are several arguments supporting the conclusion that the state lawsuits would
have been at least as successful as the settlement that was
reached. Ultimately, regardless of whether one concludes that
the state lawsuits would have resulted in verdicts against the
tobacco industry, it is apparent that the states successfully
forced the tobacco companies into a massive settlement. The
merit of the state lawsuits remains a debatable point.5" The
policy implications of the settlement, however, are more
clear. 9
1. Indications for Failure of State Lawsuits
a. Dismissed State Claims
There is a pattern among the dismissed claims in the state
lawsuits. ° In case after case, the state and federal court judg-

So. 2d at 1254. And, the State must use either a theory of market share liability
or joint and several liability, but not both. See id. at 1255-56.
On the other hand, the court upheld the abrogation of affirmative defenses,
commenting that any Due Process problems will arise in the application of the
Act. See id. at 1250. It also upheld the joinder of claims in order to promote judicial efficiency, and the use of statistical evidence to prove causation, but the court
noted that the State retains the burden of proving its case within the bounds of
the rules of procedure and evidence. See id. at 1255.
5 See infra Part I.D.1 and Part I.D.2.
5' See infra Part I.E.
60 In Illinois v. Philip Morris, the court dismissed the special duty, nuisance,
and unjust enrichment claims. No. 96L 13146 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 1997). In Indiana v. Philip Morris, the court dismissed the conspiracy, antitrust, unjust enrichment, indemnity, assumed duty, criminal mischief, and nuisance claims. No. 96L
13146 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 1997). In Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris, the
state's highest court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the deception, special
duty, and indemnity claims. 577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa, 1998). In Maryland v. Philip
Morris, the unjust enrichment, special duty, fraud, breach of warranty, negligence,
strict liability, and conspiracy claims were all dismissed. No. 96122017 (Md. Cir.
Ct. May 21, 1997). In Washington v. American Tobacco Co., the state's highest
court dismissed the state's special duty and unjust enrichment claims. No. 96-215056-8 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996). In Idaho v. Philip Morris, the
District Court dismissed the antitrust, nuisance, and conspiracy claims. No. CVOC-97-03239 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Sept. 2, 1998). And, in Texas v. American Tobacco
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es who were considering the states' claims rejected the Attorneys General's most pivotal claims-that the tobacco companies knew, but long hid, their knowledge that nicotine is pharmacologically active and highly addictive and that the tobacco
companies manipulated nicotine levels in their products to
hook unsuspecting smokers, causing the state to suffer economic damages. These courts made it clear that the states had
not adequately stated a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the tobacco industry did not have a special duty to
the states. Further, the states had not successfully pleaded
that the tobacco industry had been unjustly enriched or that it
had created a public nuisance in the marketing and distribution of tobacco. By and large, the courts found that the states
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
In sum, the Attorneys General did not successfully plead that
the tobacco companies conspired to mislead the public as to the
ill effects of smoking. 1
Two cases, Texas v. American Tobacco Co.62 in combination with Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Philip Morris,63 provide more
specific examples of why judges dismissed many of the state
claims. The tobacco company defendants in the Texas lawsuit
argued that the lawsuit could not proceed in a direct action because the State's exclusive remedy is through assignment or
subrogation pursuant to Section 32.033 of the Texas Human
Resources Code." The Eastern District of Texas rejected the

Co., the Eastern District of Texas dismissed the state's antitrust, unjust enrichment, and nuisance claims. 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 974 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
61 Several of the courts declined to dismiss the RICO, consumer protection, and
antitrust claims. (Idaho v. Philip Morris, No. CV-OC-97-03239 (Idaho Dist. Ct.
Sept. 2, 1998); Illinois v. Philip Morris, No. 96L 13146 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13,
1997); Maryland v. Philip Morris, No. 96122017 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 21, 1997); Texas v. American Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 974 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Washington
v. American Tobacco Co., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996).
Not surprisingly, the federal government's lawsuit focuses on these claims rather
than on those that were dismissed by the state and federal court judges.
£2 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
577 N.W.2d 401 (Iowa 1998).
£ In order to participate in the Medicaid program, a state must submit for
approval a plan outlining how the state will provide medical assistance under the
program. The plan must include certain provisions mandated by the federal government, including one that requires a state to take all reasonable measures to
ascertain the legal liability of third parties to pay for care and services available
under the plan and to seek reimbursement to the extent of such legal liability.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
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defendants' arguments regarding the State's ability to proceed
in a direct action, but it nonetheless dismissed the State's
claims for violation of the federal and state antitrust laws, the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act,
restitution and unjust enrichment, public nuisance, and negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking.6 5 The court
dismissed the State's antitrust claims because the State had
not suffered an antitrust injury, nor was it suing as a consumer, competitor, or other participant in the Texas cigarette market. The court dismissed the Deceptive Trade Practices claim
because the State was not a "consumer" within the Act's meaning, and thus had no standing to assert a claim pursuant to
the Act.66
The Eastern District of Texas was equally unimpressed
with the State's common law pleadings. The court dismissed
the State's claims of unjust enrichment and restitution because
the State failed to plead that it had conferred any benefit upon
the defendants. 7 Although the Texas Attorney General is authorized to bring suit to enjoin or abate a public nuisance,
none of the proscribed activities defined under the statutory
scheme were implicated in the State's claim, and the broad
definition of the elements of public nuisance urged by the State
were simply not found in Texas case law.6" The court, therefore, dismissed the State's public nuisance claim. The court
also dismissed the State's negligent performance of a voluntary
undertaking claim because the Texas courts had not extended
Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to create a
duty based upon corporate statements or advertisements. 9

In accordance with these provisions, Texas enacted a provision entitled "Subrogation," which created a separate and distinct cause of action in favor of the
State, so that the State may, without written consent, take direct civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction. See TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 32.033(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2000).
6 See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
66 See id. at 970-71.
See id. at 972 (holding that the alleged benefit enjoyed by the defendants
was too attenuated and indirect to find support under the theory of unjust enrichment and that it was dubious to assert that under Texas law defendants were
subject to a manifest duty to provide medical care to individual smokers because
the State conceded that it was under a legal duty to do so).
6 See id. at 972-73.
69 See id. at 973. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323 instructs:
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In Iowa, the State's highest court was swayed by the
defendants' remoteness argument. Iowa's petition identified
nine separate counts, and the trial court dismissed four of the
counts: civil liability for deception, voluntary assumption of a
special duty, unjust enrichment and restitution, and indemnity.70 The State appealed the dismissal of all but the unjust
enrichment and restitution claims. The defendants' argument
for dismissal was two-fold: (1) the State's exclusive remedy to
recoup Medicaid costs was under Section 249A.6 of the Iowa
Code; and (2) the State's claim to recover damages was based
on remote and derivative injuries that were unrecoverable.7'
The court found that "[a] statutory cause of action under Section 249A.6 was not pled in the petition. The State made no
subrogation claim against the defendants and [had] no common
law right to indemnity. The State's exclusive remedy for recovery of these costs [was] under section 249A.6." 2 The trial
court had dismissed the State claims of civil liability for deception, voluntary assumption of duty, and unjust enrichment,
and restitution on the grounds of remoteness of damages.7 3
The appellate court affirmed the decision, stating:
[A] failure to apply the remoteness doctrine would permit unlimited
suits to be filed. Any employer or insurer who paid medical expenses
of an employee or insured injured by smoking would have a claim

One who undertakes gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform
his undertaking, if: a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk
of such harm; or b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance
upon the undertaking.
The State had claimed that the defendants had voluntarily assumed a duty to
report honestly and completely on all research regarding cigarette smoking and
health because of their public pronouncements to do so, mainly through advertising.
7 See Iowa v. Philip Morris, Inc., 577 N.W.2d at 403.
71 See id. at 404.

Id. at 406.
See id. In making its decision on remoteness, the court considered the fact
that a state court in Minnesota had applied the remoteness doctrine to prevent
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota from bringing a direct tort action
against tobacco companies to recover for injuries to its consumers-the smokers.
That court found that while it believed that Blue Cross had been injured, the tort
was too remote for Blue Cross to recover upon it. See Minnesota v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn. 1996).
72
71
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against the tobacco industry. We are not inclined to open the proverbial flood gates of litigation to such an extent.74

In sum, the federal court in Texas found that Texas had
no antitrust or common law claims, and the highest court in
Iowa dismissed the State's common law claims. Taken together, the treatment of the claims filed by the Attorneys General
in these two states provides some indication that the state lawsuits might not have resulted in the kind of reform achieved by
the MSA.
b. Dismissal of Union Fund Lawsuits
The dismissal of a large number of the union fund lawsuits75 provides another indication that the state lawsuits
might have been unsuccessful. To begin, the union fund lawsuits and the state lawsuits against the tobacco industry are
comparable because they asserted similar theories of liability
and damages. For example, in Laborer's Local 17 Health and
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, the union claimed that the defendant tobacco companies had engaged in a conspiracy to
deceive the general public, and the plaintiff specifically, with
respect to the health risks associated with smoking.7 6 The
Union alleged that the defendants had employed an advertising campaign designed to mislead the public and had actively
concealed information that would have demonstrated the actual health risks and addictiveness of nicotine, the effectiveness
of various smoking treatments for addiction, and the
defendants' own ability to manufacture less addictive products.7 7

Furthermore, like the states' claims against the tobacco
industry, the union fund allegations included unjust enrichment, public nuisance, restitution, fraud, and misleading consumers. The lawsuits were not only similar in terms of the
theories of liability, but also in the damages claimed. Like the

' Iowa v. Philip Morris, Inc., 577 N.W.2d at 495.
7 The "union fund lawsuits" number at least twenty. They are characterized as
such here because the plaintiffs in these lawsuits are all union health and welfare
funds that are suing to recover money spent by unions under health plans to treat
union members suffering from smoking-related illnesses.
" 7 F. Supp. 2d 277, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd, 172 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1999).
77 See id.
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states, the union funds were suing for damages directly, not
under a theory of subrogation. Specifically, the union fund
plaintiffs sought past and future damages for money expended
to provide medical treatment to plan participants and beneficiaries who had suffered and were suffering from tobacco-related illnesses, and for damages allegedly inflicted on the fund's
infrastructure independent of the harm suffered by the participants, including losses suffered due to the fund's inability to
control costs and to establish programs to educate the fund's
participants not to use tobacco.78
The union funds thought that they would have success
attacking the tobacco industry by circumventing the need to
prove injury to individual smokers, thus avoiding the assumption of risk and contributory negligence defenses frequently
and successfully used by the tobacco industry. That was the
same strategy employed by the Attorneys General. But, multiple federal district courts and courts of appeal heard this strategy in the union fund lawsuits and concluded that the claims
should be dismissed on the grounds of proximate cause and/or
lack of standing.7"
However, the Second Circuit, in Laborer's Local 17, held
that the union fund suit was distinguishable from the state
tobacco lawsuits in some important respects."0 First, some of

7 See, e.g., Laborer's Local 17, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
See generally United Food and Comm. Workers Unions, Employers Health
and Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 223 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2000); Tex.
Carpenters Health Ben. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000);
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 F.3d 92 (3d
Cir. 1999); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 734 Health & Welfare Trust Fund v.
Philip Morris, 34 F. Supp. 2d 656 (N.D. Ill. 1998), affd, 196 F.3d 818 (7th Cir.
1999); Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999); R.I. Laborer's Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 99 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.C. R.I. 1999); Haw. Health & Welfare Trust Fund for
Operating Eng'rs v. Philip Morris, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D.C. HI. 1999); Ark.
Carpenters' Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 936
(E.D. Ark. 1999); Northwest Laborers-Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
On March 3, 2000, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of
New York, dismissed ten cases brought by union funds. Eastern States Health and
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 60386/97 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Mar. 3,
2000), available at Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Medical Cost Reimbursement,
http:llwww.brownandwilliamson.comIndex_sub2.cfm?ID=15 (last visited Feb. 28,
2001).
8' 191 F.3d 229, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1999).
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the state lawsuits involved statutory provisions that the state
courts had construed to authorize the states to sue directly. In
addition, in some cases, the unique quasi-sovereign rights of a
state to sue to protect the health and welfare of its citizens
could be found to sustain standing.8 ' And, generally speaking,
state cases are distinguishable on the issue of proximate causation because of the state's unique role in the protection of its

citizens.82
The dismissal of nearly all of the union fund lawsuits
further indicates that the state lawsuits, had they gone to
trial, would have been dismissed. 3 Ironworkers Local Union
No. 17 Insurance Fund v. Brown & Williamson was the first
union fund suit to be tried."4 In that case, a jury in federal
court in Ohio returned a verdict in favor of the defendant tobacco companies after hearing the union fund's case.8 5
There are, however, differences between the union fund
and state lawsuits. First, the state lawsuits were filed predominantly in state courts, whereas the union fund lawsuits were
all filed in federal courts. State court judges, and particularly
juries, might have been more receptive to novel state claims
against the tobacco industry than federal court judges and
juries. Moreover, in the union fund lawsuits, there was no

81 Id.
82 Id.
'" Not all of the Union Fund lawsuits were dismissed. Judge Weinstein, in the
Eastern District of New York, held that the plaintiffs' complaints were sufficient to
state a subrogated claim under federal RICO. The plaintiffs in this case, National
Asbestos Workers Medical Fund and Blue Cross-Blue Shield of New Jersey, qualified as subrogees who have been injured economically as a result of the misconduct of the defendants. The plaintiffs allegedly expended billions of dollars in the
treatment of smoking-related illnesses, and they were obligated to do so as part of
their legal obligation to the subrogors. See The Nat'l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund
v. Philip Morris, and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.J. v. Philip Morris, 74 F.
Supp. 2d 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Judge Weinstein also distinguished the claims in this case from those in
Laborer's Local 17. He emphasized the active role of the Blues in providing medical care to the nation and analogized its relationship to its plan participants to a
parental relationship. And, organizations with the incentives and resources of the
Blues are uniquely suited to vindicate the economic injuries sustained by the
nation's health care infrastructure. See id. at 226-27; see also infra note 241.
8 See
Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Medical Cost Reimbursement, at
http://www.brownandwilliamson.com/Indexsub2.cfm?ID=15
(last visited Feb. 28,
2001).

85 Id.
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equivalent to the states' quasi-sovereign interest in the wellbeing of the populace. 6 These differences might have led to
different judicial determinations or jury verdicts in the state
lawsuits.
c. Lack of Damages
There is another, more common sense reason to think that
the state lawsuits would not have been successful-the states
may not have sustained any economic damages as a result of
tobacco-related illness. Indeed, one commentator noted, "[Tihe
states so fervent in their rush to punish the industry may
[have found] that the huge payoff they [were] awaiting [was]
illusory."" Even if the tobacco companies had been held liable
for all smoking-related public health costs, including publiclyfunded medical care, pensions, and lost tax receipts, the courts
might have been unlikely to condone large damage awards if
cigarette excise taxes already generated net revenues in excess
of Medicaid costs. 8 In sum, the states were suing the tobacco
industry to recover external costs that (1) were imposed by
smokers on nonsmokers, (2) could not have been imposed without the complicity of the state itself, which did not ban cigarettes or tax cigarettes at a higher rate,89 (3) were unaffected
by the industry's conduct, and (4) were more than offset by the
excise taxes flowing into state treasuries. 90

" See generally Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592
(1982).
67
's

Levy, supra note 11, at 633-34.
See id. at 634.

"[Elven a relatively small price increase, such as $.25/pack, will have significant consumption decreases of 4%, with 14% decreases among 12 to 17 year-old
males . . . the hypothesized 25 cent per pack could produce long-term reductions
of at least 10,000 cigarette-caused cancer deaths annually, and possibly much
more." Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 71. The high price elasticity of demand
for cigarettes suggests that the state, given its unique power to levy taxes, has
been in complicity in not discouraging smoking.
"6See Levy, supra note 11, at 634. The results of a recent Rand Corporation
study support these conclusions. The study focused on two important factors. First,
if a smoker does not die from a smoking-related illness, he will die from something else. Accordingly, the relevant social cost is not the entire amount spent on
his illness, but the difference between the amount that was spent and that which
would have been spent on average for a non-smoker. Second, premature death
from smoking can produce long-term external benefits in the form of lower retirement costs and reduced nursing home care, not to mention reduced pension pay-

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: 2

Recent studies show that the external costs of smoking
total approximately fifty-one cents per pack, which does not
include offsets for retirement and nursing home savings. With
all expenditures and savings factored in, the total external cost
per pack is 25.3 cents, less than half of the prevailing fiftythree cent tax rate.91 Therefore, even if the Attorneys General
had managed to convince a judge or jury that the tobacco industry should have borne the blame for smoking-related Medicaid costs, they would have "won the battle and lost the war.
Quite simply, the states have suffered no monetary damage."92
2. Indications for Success of State Lawsuits
a. Powerful Plaintiffs
One factor that should not be underestimated in evaluating the potential success of the state lawsuits was the identity
of the plaintiffs. Rather than litigating in forty-eight states
against individual or class action plaintiffs, the tobacco companies were litigating against forty-eight separate states. The
absence of individual smokers whom jurors could condemn for
causing their own illness might well have contributed to verdicts for the states. In addition, politics and public opinion
played a much larger role in the state tobacco lawsuits than in
individual lawsuits. The fact that forty-eight states were suing
the tobacco industry and condemning them in the press for
lying to the public and for misleading the nation as to the true
effects of nicotine could hardly have escaped jurors' attention.
In short, had the cases been tried, the states' campaign against
the tobacco industry might well have tipped the scales in the
states' favor.
The states also had vast resources at their disposal. The
Attorneys General who filed suit against the tobacco industry
seemed to have learned a litigation lesson from the tobacco
ments. Those benefits are an offset to the near-term outlays for medical care, sick
leave, and group life insurance. See id.
"1See id. at 636-37.
92 MOLLENKAiP ET AL., supra note 13, at 639. In at least three of the state
lawsuits, however, state court judges ruled that the defendant tobacco companies
would not be able to plead the "pass-through defense." See infra Part I.D.2.d.
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industry. During the first and second waves of tobacco litigation, the tobacco industry successfully pursued a "king of the
mountain" strategy by taking countless depositions and filing
and arguing countless motions in an effort to bankrupt any
and all plaintiffs' attorneys. 3 The Attorneys General's strategy appears to have been to file lawsuits in as many states as
possible94 and to employ novel theories of liability so that it
would eventually become fiscally inefficient for the industry to
continue defending itself. The Attorneys General who filed suit
had at their disposal the financial resources of their respective
states, and in several states, outside counsel advanced the
costs of attorney time and expenses on a contingency fee basis. 5
b. State Court Judges Versus Federal Court Judges
Another factor that might have contributed to verdicts for
the states was that all but one of the state lawsuits were filed
in state court.96 Although some state court judges did dismiss
state lawsuits,97 many of the state court judges did not and
may not have done so had the settlement not been reached.
Because state court judges might have been more responsive to
political pressure and public opinion than federal court judges,
many state court judges might have allowed the lawsuits to
have been tried.
This argument is further supported by the fact that no
federal court has certified a class action against the tobacco industry," as compared to the fact that two class actions
See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 71.
9 By the time the settlements were reached, forty-eight states had filed suit
against the tobacco industry. See Levy, supra note 11, at 601.
"5See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 5, at 86. In Minnesota, for example, Blue
Cross-Blue Shield joined the state as a co-plaintiff and covered the out-of-pocket
expenses plus a contribution to attorney time spent on the case. Id. In Mississippi,
twelve law firms assisted the Attorney General with the lawsuit against the tobacco industry. In Florida, thirteen firms assisted. See The State Tobacco Information
Center, State Suit Summary Chart, at http'//stic.neu.edu/summary.htm (last visited
Feb. 28, 2001).
96 Only Texas sued in federal court. See generally Complaint, Texas v. The
American Tobacco Co., No. 5:96 CV91 (E.D. Tex. filed Mar. 28, 1996), available at
The State Tobacco Information Center, http:/www.stic.neu/edufIXnXCOMP.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2001).
9 See supra Part I.D.1.a.
9'See Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 503 (S.D. Ill.
1999) (denying
'3
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against the tobacco industry have been certified in Florida
state courts. In Broin v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,' the Court of
Appeal of Florida, Third District, certified a class of flight
attendants who were exposed to "second-hand" smoke while
aboard aircrafts. Broin was later settled during the trial."°
In Engle v. R.J. Reynolds,' the same court certified a class
of smokers seeking damages for certain diseases and medical
conditions allegedly contracted by the plaintiffs' asserted addiction to smoking. The case proceeded to trial and the jury
agreed with the class action plaintiffs that the tobacco industry
had manufactured a deadly product and had deceived the public for years." 2 The claims in Engle were the same or very
similar to the claims in the class action lawsuits that were
denied certification in federal courts across the country.'
c. Role of the Jury
The Florida jury that decided Engle made it clear to the
world that one jury has the power to cripple an industry. Their

motion for class certification); Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 98-5518, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14495, at *45 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same); Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
189 F.R.D. 544, 557 (D. Minn. 1999) (same); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 100 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (same).
641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1994).
10 See Brown & Williamson Tobacco, at http'//www.brownandwilliamson.comIndex_sub2.cfin?ID=15 (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
...672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1996).
102 See Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22 at 27-28 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. 11th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000), available at Tobacco Control Resource Center, Inc. &
The Tobacco Products Liability Project, http'//www.tobacco.neu.edu/Extra/Engle (last
visited Feb. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Engle I].
10 The defendant tobacco companies suffered a $12.7 million compensatory damages verdict and a staggering $144.8 billion punitive damages verdict in the
Engle class action. See id. at 62-65. Shortly after the punitive damage award was
decided upon by the jury, the tobacco companies attempted to remove the case to
federal District Court in Florida after a union fund filed a petition with the state
court claiming entitlement to a portion of the money awarded in the case. See
Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2000). The fact
that the tobacco companies were anxious to move to federal court for post-trial
litigation provides further support for the argument that state court judges are
more sympathetic to claims against the tobacco industry than federal court judges
(at least in Florida). Federal District Court Judge Ursula Ungaro-Benages, however, sent the judgment back to state court. See id. at 1364. On Monday, November
6, 2000, Miami-Dade County Circuit Judge Robert Kaye upheld the jury's punitive
damage award of $145 billion. See Engle I, No. 94-08273 CA-22 at 62-65.
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$144.8 billion punitive damage award against the tobacco industry is the largest punitive damage award in U.S. histo0 4 After a two year trial, the jury dropped its punitive
ry."
damages bombshell on the tobacco industry. The six jurors'
comments after the trial revealed that they felt a "sense of
mission" in this case; and that they "did not want to ignore the
tremendous devastation that [cigarettes have] caused. The
number had to match that. It had to be significant."' °5 The
Florida jury's emotional response to the tobacco industry's
alleged deception of the public could have belonged to any one
of the juries in the state lawsuits. It is apparent that any one
jury had the potential to award a state nearly as much in
punitive damages as the tobacco companies agreed to pay in
the settlement." 6 Tobacco company executives have asserted
that they will declare bankruptcy if they are forced to pay the
punitive damage award in the Engle case."0 7
d. Reduced Requirement in ProvingDamages
Although analysis of a full statistical model may prove
that the states have not suffered economic losses as a result of
smoking-related illnesses," 8 that analysis might not have
'1 See Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y.
TiES, July 15, 2000, at Al.
...Rick Bragg & Sarah Kershaw, Juror Says a "Sense of Mission" Led to Huge
Tobacco Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2000, at Al.
1" The situation is comparable to that described by Judge Posner in Matter of
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. In Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Judge Posner decertified a class
comprised of hemophiliacs infected by the AIDS virus as a consequence of using
defendant's drug manufacturers' products. See 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
Judge Posner explained that one jury composed of six people "will hold the fate of
an industry in the palm of its hand." Id. That jury will have the power to "hurl
the industry into bankruptcy." Id.
" Id. The legislatures in five states have passed or are considering bills that
limit to $25 million the requirement that a defendant in a civil lawsuit must post
cash or a bond in the full amount of the jury award plus interest while the defendant appeals. Barry Meier & Emily Yellin, Big Tobacco is Lobbying States for
Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at A20. The five states that have passed or are
considering passing such legislation are Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia. Id. The reason these states have taken such action is that "[i]f
allowed to stand, the $145 billion verdict would endanger the industry's ability to
continue paying the state, providing money that helps subsidize legislators' favorite
projects." Jacob Sullum, Tobacco's New Best Friend, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2000, at
A25.
1. See supra Part I.D.I.c.
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been conducted had the state lawsuits been tried. At least in
Minnesota and Texas, the presiding judges decided that the
states could determine which statistical model to use. In addition, the tobacco companies would not be able to use the defense that the states had not suffered economic losses by passing on any expenses that they incurred to the federal government or to taxpayers.
In Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc.,"°9 the Supreme Court

of Minnesota decided that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota could join the State as a plaintiff for two reasons. 1 '
First, Blue Cross and Blue Shield had standing by "plain statutory grants" with respect to its antitrust and consumer fraud
claims."' Second, the tobacco companies would not have been
able to use the "pass through defense"--the argument that
"any increased costs associated with increased medical care
needed by its nicotine-addicted consumers will simply be
passed on to employer subscribers.""' As a result, the State
argued that, if its lawsuit had gone to trial, the tobacco companies would not have been able to assert that the State was
ultimately reimbursed a portion of its Medicare costs by the
federal government; instead, the State would have been permitted to seek recovery of the full extent of its damages."
In Texas v. American Tobacco Co.," 4 the Eastern District
of Texas declined to dismiss the State's claims for remoteness." 5 Because the State brought its action based on its
quasi-sovereign interests in protecting the health, welfare, and
well-being of the populace, the court found that there was "no
better party to prosecute this matter.""' Moreover, the court
found that quasi-sovereign interest lawsuits "will always involve a harm to individuals, but it is this harm and a state's

'0 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996).
110 Id. at 496.
111Id.

Id.
See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Consolidated Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Certain Damages Issues: Recovery of FedIII.B, Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d
eral Share of Medicaid at
490 (Minn. 1996) (No. C1-94-8565), available at The State Tobacco Information
Center, http-/www.stic.neu.edu/MN/MNTOC.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
114 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
11 See id. at 968.
11 See id.
112
11
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interest in protecting against it that provides the basis" for
such an action."' The court approved the State's proposed
proof of damages by use of a statistical model, the details of
which were not available to the court when it made its decision." 8 This opinion demonstrated that at least this court
was willing to let a case proceed to trial without undue concern
as to whether, or how, the State would ultimately be able to
prove that it had suffered damages.
3. Summary of Indicators
In sum, it is not clear whether the tobacco industry would
have been defeated in state courts by the forty-eight states
that set out to regulate the industry. Nonetheless, many of the
reforms sought by the Attorneys General have been achieved
without a single lawsuit having been tried to verdict. Moreover, the fact that industry-wide reform was achieved without
a single jury reaching a verdict has serious policy implications.
The fact that industry-wide reform was sought by means of
litigation has critical policy implications. These policy concerns
will be discussed in Section E.
E. Policy Implications
In the process of addressing a union fund lawsuit, a federal district court judge opined that "[wlhether an industry
should be penalized for successfully marketing a legal product
is certainly an interesting question, but it is beyond the scope
of any single lawsuit. Policymaking on such a scale is ordinarily best left to the legislature.""' State and federal legislatures are better equipped than the nation's courts to manage
the regulation of tobacco products. 2 ' Unlike courts, legisla"" See id.
its See id.
...Laborer's Local 17 Health and Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 7 F.
Supp. 2d 277, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Scheindlin, J.).
120 Interestingly, the manufacture, marketing, and advertising of tobacco products are regulated. For example, the Department of Agriculture sets production
quotas and price levels for tobacco. Congress has authorized the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms to qualify and regulate cigarette manufacturers. Of course,
in 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
which established a federal program to address the relationship between smoking
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tures are designed to address the issue. Furthermore, "the
remedies that regulatory bodies could impose are infinitely
more subtle than the off-on toggle switch between dramatically
high tort liability and practically no liability at all." 2 ' Taxation, for example, provides a more efficient means of regulating
tobacco than large scale damage awards. Because individuals
choose to smoke, raising the price of each pack would create a
deterrence, which would in turn reduce health care costs. The
health care costs of
tax revenue could then be used to offset
122
smoking.
in
persist
to
choose
who
those
Some commentators argue that it is precisely because of
the failure of legislatures and administrative agencies to regulate tobacco that litigation provides a better means of controlling the sale and use of tobacco." They argue that smoking
generates externalities in the economy (i.e., market failure),
particularly because it generates addictive behavior. But it is
difficult to see where the market has failed; Americans smoke
too much, but that is probably because they prefer to smoke
despite their knowledge of the relevant risks. 24 Even if there
is market failure, the market itself can adjust in subtle, incremental ways to affect the relevant risks of injury. For example,
a "growing number of life and health insurance companies ex-

and health. Under that program, cigarette manufacturers are required to place
Surgeon General warnings on each and every pack of cigarettes, as well as on all
cigarette advertisements. All other cigarette advertising is subject to the scrutiny
of the Federal Trade Commission. Cigarette manufacturers are required to report
the tar and nicotine yields of their products to the Federal Trade Commission
annually. Similarly, manufacturers must report all ingredients contained in cigarettes to the Department of Health and Human Services annually. States also
regulate tobacco production and distribution. They tax cigarettes sales and certain
individual states have enacted laws requiring manufacturers to provide tar and
nicotine tests and ingredient reports different from those required by the federal
government. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco, at http://www.brownandwilliamson.corn (last visited Sept. 6, 2000).
121 James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1263, 1330 (1991).
1" The argument for increased taxation as an efficient means of regulation is
buttressed by the fact that studies have shown that the price elasticity of demand
for cigarettes is relatively high. Even a relatively small price increase will lead to
significant consumption decreases, especially among teenagers. See Kelder &
Daynard, supra note 5, at 71.
1'2See

id. at 63.

.24See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121, at 1330.
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tend more favorable rates to nonsmokers.""2 This kind of
non-judicial regulation is even more capable of flexibility than
legislation.
Legislative or market regulations of tobacco products are
not only more effective and efficient than court-imposed solutions, they are also more appropriate. "By using litigation to
achieve goals that properly belong to legislation, the [tobacco
lawsuits] would short-circuit democratic debate on public issues."126 Regulation of tobacco products has been a hotly debated subject for many years. Such a publicly controversial
subject is one best left for democratically-elected legislators to
mull over. If any rules are to be established to control this
activity, which millions of Americans enjoy and which generates billions of dollars of revenue for the economy, it should be
within the control of legislatures rather than the courts.
The Fifth Circuit denied class certification in Castano v.
American Tobacco Co.'27 because "[cilass certification creates
insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas
individual trials would not. The risk of facing an all-or-nothing
verdict presents too high a risk, even where the probability of
an adverse judgment is low." 128 Although the court was ex-

plaining why class certification was not appropriate in
Castano, the same logic applies to the state lawsuits against
the tobacco industry. In fact, the state lawsuits imposed much
more settlement pressure on the tobacco industry than would a
class action. Indeed, simultaneously litigating against fortyeight states obviously put insurmountable pressure on the
tobacco companies to settle. The dubious merits of the state
lawsuits make it apparent that the states' goal was to force the
tobacco companies to settle the claims. This goal represents a
gross abuse of the judicial system.

Id. at 1331.
,2 Uncle Sam v. Big Tobacco, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1999, at 22.
'22 84 F.3d 734, 476 (5th Cir. 1996).
'28 84 F.3d at 746. Similarly, in Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., Judge
"

Posner decertified a class of hemophiliacs infected with the AIDS virus because
the defendants successfully argued that they were at risk of suffering irreparable
harm from immense settlement pressure. See 51 F.3d at 1297-99. The court quoted
Judge Henry J. Friendly, who called settlements induced by a small probability of
a massive judgment "blackmail settlements." See id. at 1298 (quoting HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 120 (1973)).
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Even if one were to agree that the public entity litigation
used to reform the tobacco industry was not an abuse of the
judicial system or a usurpation of the role of representative
government, the fact remains that it was an inefficient means
of reform. The problem was that a large portion of the proceeds
were absorbed by legal costs and trial lawyers' contingency
fees.'2 9 In fact, over $10 billion in legal fees from the tobacco
settlements will be shared by more than 100 firms." Additionally, the public entity lawsuits defeat two of the central
purposes of tort law.
One of the purposes of tort law is to serve a loss-spreading function;
defendants (often large companies) can, by means of rates, prices,
taxes or insurance, distribute to the public at large the risks and
losses which are inevitable in a complex civilization. But there are
obvious limitations upon the power of a defendant to shift the loss to
the public, and the courts frequently have been reluctant to saddle
an industry with the entire burden of the harm it may cause, for
fear that it may prove ruinously heavy. This is particularly true
where the liability may extend to an unlimited number of unknown
persons, and is incapable of being estimated or insured against in
advance.'

The tobacco industry cannot possibly insure against the losses
claimed by the public entities, nor can it pass on to consumers,
in addition to the billions of dollars it has already agreed to
pay the states in the settlements, the cost of billions of dollars
in punitive damages.
Another central purpose of tort law is to compensate specific victims for damages suffered as a result of the conduct of
another.'32 If the public entities have not been damaged directly, the tobacco companies, and potentially the gun companies, will be paying billions of dollars in damages without actually compensating specific victims.
Finally, it is beyond doubt that the use of public entity
litigation to force industry reform will not be limited to tobacco. According to Larry Kraus, President of the U.S. Chamber of
"2 See Richard Tomkins, Opening the Floodgates, FINANcIAL TIMES Nov. 17,

1998, at 17 (quoting George Priest, Professor of Law and Economics at Yale Law
School).
...See Adam Cohen, Are Lawyers Running America?, TIME, July 17, 2000, at
24.
131 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, at 22.
132 See id. at 6.
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Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, the alcohol and fast
foods industries should be getting very nervous. 3 ' Indeed, he
stated, "Anyone who doesn't think this is going to happen is
badly mistaken
...because it has already started with the gun
134
industry."

II. THE GUN MANUFACTURER LITIGATION
A. Background
Gun manufacturers, like the tobacco companies, have
increasingly become targets of public entity litigation. Beginning in the fall of 1998 with New Orleans and Chicago, thirtytwo cities and counties and one state have filed lawsuits
against the gun industry 35 seeking to recover the costs they
have allegedly incurred as a result of gun-related violence.3 5
1" Tomkins, supra note 129, at 17 (interviewing Larry Kraus). The next target
for the trial lawyers are the HMO's. See Cohen, supra note 130, at 23; John
Neylar, They're Ba-a-ck!, FORTUNE, June 26, 2000, at 16.
, Tompkins, supra note 129, at 17 (interviewing Larry Kraus).
'= Although advocates of the gun litigation have at various times claimed that
the litigation was directed solely towards recovering damages caused by handguns
and imposing restrictions on the sale of handguns alone, any such distinction can
no longer be made. The local governments' complaints and briefs occasionally mention handguns in particular, but generally refer to the "gun industry," "firearms,"
or "illegal firearms" and cite statistics of firearms sales and firearms-related damages that make no distinction between different types of firearms. See generally
First Amended Complaint, Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-015596
(Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1998); Complaint, Morial v. Smith & Wesson
Corp. (New Orleans), No. 98-18578 (Parish of Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30,
1998); Brief and Separately Bound Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Ganim v.
Smith & Wesson Corp. (Bridgeport), No. A.C. 20382 (Conn. App. Ct. filed Jan. 27,
1999), all available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
'" The city, county, and state lawsuits include, in chronological order by filing
date: New Orleans, LA (Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 98-18578 Div. M
(Parish of Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998)); Chicago/Cook County, IL
(Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98-CH-015596 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Nov.
12, 1998)); Bridgeport, CT (Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 06-CV-9901531988 (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 1999)); Miami/Dade County, FL (Penelas
v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-01941-CA-06 (11th Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade County filed
Jan. 27, 1999)); Atlanta, GA (Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-VS0149217J (Fulton County Ct. filed Feb. 5, 1999)); Cleveland, OH (White v. HiPoint Firearms, No. CV-99-381897 (Cuyahoga County C.P. filed Apr. 8, 1999)); Detroit, MI (Archer v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99-912-658-NZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct.
filed Apr. 26, 1999)); Wayne County, MI (McNamara v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 99912-662-NZ (Wayne County Cir. Ct. filed Apr. 26, 1999)); Cincinnati, OH (Cincin-
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The success of the tobacco litigation has played an important
role in the local governments' decisions to file lawsuits against
the gun industry. "7 Judge Robert F. McWeeny, deciding
Bridgeport's suit against the gun manufacturers, wrote, "In
advance of their unusual theories supporting this litigation,
the plaintiffs draw inspiration if not precedent from the

'tobacco' cases. "138

Just as the public entity lawsuits in the tobacco litigation
were followed by a federal suit, the municipal, county, and
state lawsuits of the gun manufacturers have led to a potential
federal suit. On December 7, 1999, the Clinton Administration

threatened to file a massive lawsuit against the gun
industry. "9 The plaintiff in the suit would be the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), which would file
a class action suit on behalf of 3,200 public housing authorities
nationwide. 4 HUD would seek to recover money spent on

nati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A-99023169, (Ohio Ct. C.P. filed Apr. 28, 1999));
St. Louis, MO (St. Louis v. Cernicek, No. CV-992-01209 (St. Louis Cir. Ct. filed
Apr. 30, 1999)); Alameda County, Berkeley, East Palo Alto, Oakland, Sacramento,
San Francisco and San Mateo County, CA (People v. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc.,
No. 303753 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed May 25, 1999)); Compton, Englewood, Los Angeles and West Hollywood, CA (People v. Arcadia Mach. & Tool, Inc., No. BC-210894
(L.A. Super. Ct. filed May 25, 1999)); Camden County, NJ (Camden County Bd. Of
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 99-CV-2518 (D.N.J. filed June 1,
1999)); Boston, MA (Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-VS-0149217J (Suffolk
County Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999)); Newark, NJ (James v. Arcadia Mach. &
Tool, Inc., No. ESX-L-6059-99 (Essex County Super. Ct. filed June 9, 1999)); Camden, NJ (Camden v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 451099 (Camden County Super. Ct.
filed June 21, 1999)); Los Angeles County, CA (People v. Arcadia Mach. & Tool,
Inc., No. BC-214794 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 6, 1999)); Gary, IN (Gary v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., No. 45D029908-CT-355 (Lake Super. Ct. Filed Aug. 27, 1999));
Wilmington, DE (Sills v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-C-09283 (New Castle
County Super. Ct. filed Sept. 29, 1999)); Washington, D.C. (D.C. v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., No. 00-0000428 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 20, 2000)); New York City (New
York City v. Arms Tech., Inc., No. 00 CV (E.D.N.Y. filed June 20, 2000)); New
York State v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 402586 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County filed June
26, 2000). Almost all of the complaints are available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.orgdecisions (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
"' The tobacco litigation served as a model for the gun litigation. See infra
Part II.C.1.
1" Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (Bridgeport), No. 06-CV-99-01531988 at 11,
1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3330, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dist. Waterbury Dec. 10,
1999).
..
9 See Paul M. Barrett & Bob Davis, Administration Threatens Massive Suit
Against Gun Industry to Force Changes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1999, at A3.
.. See id.
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security for the prevention of gun violence within the housing
authorities.'
The pressure on the gun manufacturers to settle the public
entity claims is mounting, just as it did during the tobacco
litigation. Yet, the gun manufacturers are far more vulnerable
than were the cigarette companies. The cigarette companies
have extremely deep pockets-in 1995, Americans spent $48.7
billion on tobacco products, mostly on nearly 490 billion cigarettes' 4 -- but the gun industry's combined sales total only
$1.4 billion per year.
The tobacco industry seems to have
survived the public entity litigation, but declining sales in the
wake of the Brady Bill mean that perhaps only the largest gun
manufacturers, like Colt's Manufacturing Co. or Beretta
U.S.A., will survive the litigation.'" Faced with the prospect
of litigating against multiple local governments, gun manufacturers have met privately with negotiators for large American
cities. 45 Indeed, Smith & Wesson, in a move similar to
Liggett's early break with the tobacco industry, 46 has already
agreed to a number of manufacturing, sales, and distribution
"restrictions" in exchange for immunity from lawsuits by cities,
states, and the federal government. 47 In addition, Colt's
Manufacturing Co. recently reported that it will stop making
commercial handguns in an attempt to avoid a potentially
devastating jury verdict. 4 8

..See id. There has been no indication that the Bush Administration will advocate such a lawsuit, but the Bush Administration has no control over the local
lawsuits.
...See Frank J. Chaloupka & Kenneth E. Warner, The Economics of Smoking,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, No. 7047, March, 1999, at 39.

" See Angie Cannon, Now Gun Makers Are in the Crosshairs, U.S. NEWS
ONLINE, at http'/www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/990208/8guns.htm

(last modified

Feb. 2, 1998). One might think $1.4 billion dollars should be considered "deep
pockets," but it is a modest figure relative to the litigation costs and potential
awards arising out of lawsuits filed by thirty-three public entities.
144 See id.
".

See Myron Levin, Gun Makers, Plaintiffs Discuss Settlement, L.A. TIMES,

Sept. 28, 1999, at C-3.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
,4 See Smith & Wesson Clarification of the March 17, 2000 Settlement Document Agreement, available at http'J/www.smith-wesson.commisclagreementl.html.
Ironically, as the settlement repeatedly points out, Smith & Wesson already meets
most of the standards required by the settlement. See generally id.
14' Denise Lavoie, Colt's to Stop Taking New Orders for Guns, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, available at abcnews.com, http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/dailynewst-
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B. Public Entity Claims
The local governments' lawsuits against the gun manufacturers allege a number of varying causes of action, but the
most prevalent are products liability for design defect, failure
to warn,"
and negligent marketing and distribution.5 °
Some of the public entity lawsuits have already been dismissed, while others have survived. 5 ' To date, the greatest
success for gun litigation plaintiffs has actually been: in a suit
brought by private plaintiffs. In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,'52 a
Brooklyn jury held fifteen gun manufacturers liable under the
negligent marketing and distribution theory.' The decision
marked the first time that a court applying New York law had
held a manufacturer liable for non-negligent manufacturing of
a lawful, but dangerous, product and the first time that a gun
manufacturer had ever been held liable for damages caused by
criminal shootings.'5 4 The verdict and accompanying decision
no doubt encouraged the local governments in their efforts to
use litigation to regulate gun manufacturers' business practices. 5"' 5 Yet, the precedential value of Hamilton is unclear

colt991011.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
1" New Orleans was the first city to use these theories. See Complaint at 1416, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (New Orleans), No. 98-18578 (Parish of Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
" See Brief and Separately Bound Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1,
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (Bridgeport), No. A.C. 20382 (Conn. App. Ct.
May 1, 2000), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
...See discussion infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
152 62 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also discussion infra Part II.B.2.
153

See 62 F. Supp. at 808.

New York courts had previously rejected strict liability claims against manufacturers of guns and ammunition. See McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157
(2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a manufacturer of hollow point bullets was not liable
on design defect claim because such bullets function as designed); DeRosa v.
Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a shotgun working as designed was not unreasonably dangerous for its foreseeable use);
see also Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 824 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that manufacturing and selling non-defective handguns was not grounds for strict
liability under New York law). Hamilton is discussed in greater detail in Section
2, which analyzes the negligent marketing/distribution theory.
...Bridgeport has already cited the Hamilton decision in its appeal of the trial
court's decision to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss. See Brief and Separately Bound Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants Mayor Joseph P. Ganim at 1 (Bridge15
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because the Second Circuit recently certified to the New York
Court of Appeals the main issues involved-whether gun manufacturers could be held liable for the non-defective manufacture and distribution of a lawful product and whether damages
could be apportioned according
to a market-share theory of
156
liability (and if so, how).

In general, there have been a sufficient amount of filings
and decisions to warrant an examination of the individual
claims filed by local governments against gun manufacturers
and the merits of those claims.
1.

Products Liability for Design Defect and Failure to
Warn
a. Design Defect

Most of the local governments suing the gun manufacturers included claims of products liability for defective design. 5 ' For example, New Orleans alleged that the guns sold
were defective because the gun manufacturers failed to "employ alternative designs which would have reduced, if not prevented, many of plaintiffs' damages." 5 ' Yet, several private
plaintiffs have tried to use this claim in lawsuits against gun
or ammunition manufacturers, but such claims have repeatedly been dismissed.5 9 These claims were dismissed either because the risk versus utility balancing typically sought by the
plaintiffs does not even apply absent a defect in the product (in
the sense that the product malfunctions), 6 ' or because the
port), No. A.C. 20382 (Conn. App. Ct. May 1, 2000), available at Firearms
Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.orgdecisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
' See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 222 F.3d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 2000).
,7 See, e.g., Complaint at 14, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (New Orleans),
No. 98-18578 (Parish of Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998); Complaint at
12, Atlanta v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-VS-0149217J (Fulton County Ct.
filed Feb. 5, 1999); Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint at 35, Boston v. Smith &
Wesson Corp., No. 99-02590 (Suffolk County Super. Ct. filed June 3, 1999), all
available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http'l/www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
...
See Complaint at 14, Morial, No. 98-18578.
9 See, e.g., McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 157; Martin v. Harrington & Richardson,
Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1997); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250,
1272 (5th Cir. 1985).
" See McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 155. The McCarthy court explained that "[tihe
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plaintiffs generally failed to identify any specific defect in the
product that caused it to malfunction.16 1 In other words, a
gun that functions properly is not defectively designed simply
because it ismisused.
The design defect claims against gun manufacturers have
appropriately been dismissed because they are not the kind of
defect claims for which the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides a remedy. Section 402 of the Restatement states that
a seller of a product may be held strictly liable for physical
harm to a user or consumer if the product sold is "in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."162 The comments to Section 402 state that a "defective
condition" exists:
[WIhere the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he
delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling
or other causes make it harmful .
163

Thus, although a gun is certainly dangerous, a consumer seeking to hold a gun manufacturer liable for design defect has the
unenviable task of establishing that guns leave the sellers'
hands in a "condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer.""6 A consumer would have a difficult time proving
that when he received a gun, he did not think that firing it at
himself or another would cause damage.
Despite the lack of precedent in either case law or the
Restatement, the local governments' design defect actions
against the gun manufacturers have achieved a modest degree
of success. For example, Boston's defective design claim survived a motion to dismiss, but the decision did not give much
indication as to the merits of the claim.16 5 Similarly, the

purpose of the risk/utility analysis is to determine whether the risk of injury
might have been reduced or avoided if the manufacturer had used a feasible alternative design. Id. (citing Urena v. Biro Mfg. Co., 114 F.3d 259, 364 (2d. Cir.

1997)).

161 See Perkins, 762 F.2d at 1272.
13

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965) (emphasis added).
Id. § 402A cmt. g.

164

Id.

162

" The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs were using the design defect
theory in a novel way, and that the court would reserve judgment until all the
facts had been entered into the record. See Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.
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design defect claim also survived a motion to disCleveland
miss.166 Yet, the decision hinged on a federal court's interpretation of the Ohio Product Liability Act (the "Ohio Act"), 167
and that interpretation directly contradicted that of the state
trial court hearing Cincinnati's suit.'68 The different interpretations of the Ohio Act in the Cleveland and Cincinnati cases
are worth examining because they are illustrative of the fundamental problem in the gun manufacturer litigation-the claims
are so broad and diffuse in nature that courts cannot adequately address them.
In an unusual move, the federal district court hearing
Cleveland's suit held that the defendant gun manufacturers'
argument that a manufacturer could only be held liable in
strict products liability or negligent design for defects in a
product at the time it left a manufacturer's plant failed because the plaintiffs alleged that every firearm of each defendant was defective. 169 The court's decision regarding the

defendants' argument that a products liability action could not
be based on the injuries resulting from the deliberate misuse of
a product was also unusual. The court cited the case of Perkins
v. Wilkinson Sword,70 in which an Ohio state court held that
the risk versus utility test of the Ohio Act could be used to
show that the design of a properly functioning lighter was
defective, as precedent for holding that a manufacturer's failure to incorporate safety features could provide a basis for
liability.' 7 ' That analogy was inappropriate as there is a fundamental difference between the two products-one is designed
to light tobacco products or controlled fires, while the other is

99-02590 at 36 n.74 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dist. Waterbury Dec. 10, 1999), available at
Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http'//www.firearmslitigation.orgdecisions.html
(last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
"6 See White v. Smith and Wesson Corp. (Cleveland), No. 1:99 CV 1134 at 15
(N.D. Ohio 2000), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.orgdecisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
167 OHio REV. CODE § 2307.71 et seq. (1988).
" See White, No. 1:99 CV 1134 at 15; Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No.
A9902369 at 2, 1999 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 27, at *5-6 (Oh. Ct. C.P. Oct. 7, 1999)
thereinafter Cincinnati 1].
.. See White, No. 1:99 CV 1134 at 15. The plaintiffs alleged that every gun
sold was defective because they did not contain feasible safety mechanisms such as
trigger locks. See id.
70 700 N.E.2d 1247 (Ohio 1998).
1 See White, No. 1:99 CV 1134 at 15 (citing Perkins, 700 N.E.2d at 1250).
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designed for target shooting, hunting, or self-defense.
The district court's decision in the Cleveland case was
truly ironic in that three of the defendants, Glock, Inc.; H&R
1871, Inc.; and Hi-Point Firearms, removed the case from state
court with the other defendants' consent. 7 2 Apparently, they
would have fared better had they remained in state court. In
Cincinnati's suit against the gun manufacturers, an Ohio state
court reached a very different conclusion as to the validity of
such design defect claims under Ohio state law:
Rather than identifying a specific product, specific defect, an identified manufacturer, and a specific injury with a causal connection, as
the City acknowledges is required under the 1988 Ohio Product
Liability Act, the complaint instead aggregates anonymous claims
with no specificity whatsoever. To the extent the City pursues a
theory of collective liability, no recognized theory of collective liability under Ohio law applies in these circumstances. Further, neither
the law of Ohio nor any jurisdiction of which this Court is aware
permits recovery in strict liability for the intentional use of a product to accomplish an intended result such as homicide or suicide.'

So, which court had it right, the federal or state court? It
recently became clear that the federal court should have reserved judgment on such a novel theory of recovery until it had
been resolved by the state courts. On August 11, 2000, Ohio's
intermediate appellate court, the Ohio Court of Appeals, affirmed the state trial court's dismissal of Cincinnati's
claims.'7 4 The court noted that the Ohio Act defines the
"harm" for which a plaintiff can recover as including "death,
physical injury to person, serious emotional distress, or physical damage to property."176 Cincinnati was seeking to recover
only for economic loss (money spent on services arising out of
gun violence) and had alleged no damage to city property, and
therefore it could not recover in strict liability under the Ohio

See id. at 2.
'" Cincinnati I, No. A9902369 at 2, 1999 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 27, at *5-6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
...See Cincinnati V. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369 at 2 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 11, 2000), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http:/www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Cincinnati
I 175 See
e. id. at 5.
172
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Act.17 6 The appellate court also echoed the trial court's language when it held that Cincinnati had failed to identify any
specific product, defect, or defendant.'77
The trial court's decision and the affirmation on appeal
would suggest that Cincinnati's prospects for success are grim.
Yet, Ohio, like many states, is currently in the midst of a decade-long battle over tort reform.'78 The highest court-the
Ohio Supreme Court-is dominated by a four-judge majority
that one commentator has described as a "super legislature."'79 The majority has repeatedly declared tort reform legislation enacted by the Ohio General Assembly to be unconstitutional. In the most recent round, the Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers and the Ohio AFL-CIO challenged the validity of 1998
Ohio Laws 350, a massive tort reform bill that amended, enacted, or repealed over 100 sections of the Ohio Revised
Code.18 ° This case should not even have been heard by the
supreme court because the plaintiffs alleged no personal injury
to establish standing in court-they merely claimed to be acting to prevent potential economic loss and for the general public good.' 8' Nevertheless, the court took the opportunity to
exercise judicial review, and held that the law "intrudes upon
judicial power by declaring itself constitutional, by reenacting
legislation struck down as unconstitutional, and by interfering
with this court's power to regulate court procedure." 8 2
As the decision illustrated, the Ohio tort reform battle
encompasses debates ranging from constitutional to products
liability law, and it could easily be the subject of a hundred
law review articles. The Ohio debate is relevant to this Note
only insofar as it demonstrates that the scope of potential
176See
177 See
178 See

id.
id. at 6-7.
generally Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War Continues, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 539 (1997) [hereinafter Werber, The War Continues];
Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform Versus the Ohio Constitution, 68 TEAIPLE L.
REV. 1155 (1996).
179 See Werber, The War Continues, supra note 178, at 539.
. See generally State ex. rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715
N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
...See id. at 1079-80. Typically, the constitutionality of a law is challenged as
various private civil actions act as vehicles to challenge different parts of a law,
and the Court acknowledged that over twenty private challenges to various sections of the law were pending in Ohio courts. See id. at 1080 n.9.
1- Id. at 1076.
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liability under tort law and, in particular, products liability for
design defect, such as that alleged in the local governments'
lawsuits against the gun manufacturers, has expanded to the
point where it touches on public policy. For example, whereas
few people would argue against holding a gun manufacturer
liable for damages resulting from the sale of a defective batch
of guns that repeatedly discharged without the triggers being
pulled, the question of whether a gun manufacturer can be
held strictly liable for the non-negligent manufacturer and sale
of a lawful product is too controversial to be decided by an entrenched, four-judge "super legislature." Judge Robert P.
Ruehlman, in dismissing Cincinnati's suit against the gun
manufacturers, wrote that the city's claims were "an improper
attempt to have this court substitute its judgment for that of
the legislature."183 Yet, that is likely to happen when Cincinnati appeals.
The design defect debate is by no means confined to Ohio.
Indeed, while the Boston design defect claim survived a motion
to dismiss, the court in the Miami-Dade suit dismissed the
plaintiffs' design defect claim for the exact same reasons as the
state court in Cincinnati.' The conflicting opinions in the
different jurisdictions indicate that the issue, while cloaked in
the language of design defect, is really a question of the boundaries of products liability law. This Note will identify similar
problems in the other claims used by the local governments,
but this basic conflict indicates that the differences in the
treatment of the local governments' claims actually reflect
fundamental differences of opinion on public policy.
b. Failureto Warn
Another theory upon which the public entity plaintiffs are
seeking to hold the gun manufacturers liable is failure to

" Cincinnati I, No. A99-02369 at 2, 1999 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 27, at *4 (Oh. Ct.
C.P. Oct. 7, 1999).
1" The court held that "[tihe County's products liability counts fail because they
fail to state claims for a particular plaintiff injured as a result of a specific alleged defect in a particular product." Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc. (Miami-Dade),
No. 99-01941 CA-06 at 5 (11th Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade County Dec. 13, 1999) (citations omitted), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
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warn.'8 5 The plaintiffs are arguing that the gun manufacturers have failed to adequately warn consumers of the dangers of
gun use.' This theory, like the design defect theory, has
consistently failed when advanced by private plaintiffs against
gun manufacturers because there is no obligation to warn
when the dangers inherent in the use of a product are open
and obvious.'87
Similarly, the public entities' claim of failure to warn does
not seem to be the kind of action envisioned by the drafters of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement states
that "a seller is not required to warn with respect to products ...when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized.""8 Thus, guns are not "unreasonably dangerous" under Section 402 of the Restatement because
everyone is well aware that a properly functioning gun can
cause serious injury or death and that guns are, in fact, designed to injure or kill. 9
Nevertheless, each court that has rendered a decision in
the local governments' lawsuits has treated the failure to warn
claims in the same manner as it treated the design defect
claims. The federal court hearing Cleveland's suit held that the
court could not say, as a matter of law, that the dangers of gun
use were well known; rather, the court held that the issue was
one of fact for a jury to decide."9 That holding was, of course,
contradicted by both the state trial and appellate courts hearing Cincinnati's suit.'9 ' In likening the failure to warn claim
to that of design defect, the Ohio Court of Appeals held, "The
city's failure to warn claims... miss the mark, too, not only

" See, e.g., Complaint at 15-16, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (New Orleans), No. 98-18578 (Parish of Orleans Civ. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 30, 1998), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http'J/www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
'

See id.

See Treadway v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 950 F. Supp. 1326, 1332 (E.D.
Mich. 1996); Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758, 760 (D.C. 1989).
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j. (1965).
...
See Treadway, 950 F. Supp. at 1336.
" See White v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (Cleveland), No. 1:99 CV 1134 at 17
(N.D.Ohio 2000), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
...See Cincinnati I, No. A9902369 at 3, 1999 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 27, at *10-11
(Oh. Ct. C.P. Oct. 7, 1999), affd, Cincinnati II, No. A9902369 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug.
11, 2000).
'
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due to the city's failure to identify injuries caused by specific
manufacturers or products, but also because the manufacturers
have no duty to give warnings about the obvious dangers of
192 Similarly, in the Boston case, the court treated
handguns."
the failure to warn claim as it did the design defect claim. The
court held that it could not declare, as a matter or law, that
the dangers posed by firearms were open and obvious.19 3
Thus, each court treated the products liability claims in
the same manner. Most likely, this was because the courts that
allowed one products liability claim to proceed had more expansive views of the limits of products liability law, and thus
also allowed other products liability claims to proceed. Likewise, the courts with the more narrow, traditional view of
products liability law dismissed all products liability claims.
This trend, sure to continue as courts in other jurisdictions
render decisions, also reveals a fundamental problem in the
gun manufacturer litigation, namely, that the theories advanced reach the limits of the law and enter into the realm of
public policy.
2. Negligent Marketing and Distribution
The greatest success in the litigation against the gun manufacturers has been Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,"M in which relatives of six people killed by handguns and one handgun violence survivor and his mother sued twenty-five handgun manufacturers.'9 5 Federal District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein

White, No. 1:99 CV 1134 at 8.
" See Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-02590 at 38 (Suffolk County

192

Super. Ct. July 13, 2000), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse,
http://www.firearmslitigation.orgdecisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
...62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Developments during the Hamilton case
prompted Temple law professor David Kairys, who in 1996 joined a mayoral commission on youth violence in Philadelphia, to propose to Philadelphia Mayor Edward Rendell that Philadelphia file a nuisance suit against the gun industry. See
Paul M. Barrett, Evolution of a Cause: Why the Gun Debate has Finally Taken
Off, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1999, at A19 [hereinafter Barrett, Evolution of a Cause].
In 1997, Mayor Rendell retained Kairys to draft such a suit, but it was never
filed. See id. In January, 1998, Kairys stopped representing Philadelphia and faxed
or mailed over 100 copies of "litigation blueprints" to municipal lawyers throughout
the country. See id. Kairys became a legal advisor to most of the public entities
suing the gun industry. See id.
...See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. at 808.
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of the Eastern District of New York entered a decision after a
Brooklyn jury had found fifteen of the gun manufacturers
liable for negligent marketing and distribution of handguns. 19 6 The court apportioned damages according to each
handgun manufacturer's share of the total handgun market.197 Hamilton marked the first time that a court applying
New York law had held a manufacturer liable for non-negligent manufacturing of a dangerous product, and the first time
that gun manufacturers had ever been held liable for damages
caused by criminal shootings.'98 In fact, in the Hamilton decision, Judge Weinstein noted that in New York, manufacturers
of guns and ammunition could only be held strictly liable if the
product were defective or unreasonably dangerous for its foreseeable use.199 Judge Weinstein wrote:
Recovery in strict liability is predicated on the existence of a defect,
either in the design of the product, the manufacture of the product
or the warnings provided by the manufacturer. On the ground that
the proof failed to fit the case into one of these categories, courts
have rejected strict liability claims against manufacturers of guns

and ammunition."'

Having rejected the plaintiffs' design defect claim, Judge
Weinstein turned to the theory that the gun manufacturers
were liable for negligent marketing and distribution of their
products."' Judge Weinstein wrote, "The precise duty alleged
in this case is that of handgun manufacturers to exercise reasonable care in marketing and distributing their products so as
to guard against the risk of criminal misuse."" 2 This theory
was subtly different from those that had previously failed to
hold gun manufacturers liable for criminal shootings because it
alleged that while "the sale of the weapon is not itself tortious,
the method of sale and distribution by producers may be."' 3
The causation requirement necessary to sustain a negligent marketing claim is very similar to that of a lawsuit in

1" See id.

See id. at 845.
See supra note 154.
...See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
20 Id. at 824.
211 See id.
at 823-24.
212 Id. at 824.
200 Id. at 825.
"

'o
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mass tort.0 4 In either type of lawsuit, liability turns only on
a statistical probability of causation and a causal link between
the plaintiff and defendant. °5 Judge Weinstein explained this
similarity in Hamilton by describing the causation requirements of a mass tort suit:
[Pilaintiffs prove causation by establishing by a preponderance of

the evidence that exposure to a particular substance causes the
disease in question, and that exposure to this product-regardless of
who may have manufactured the unit involved-caused the plain-

tiffs to develop the disease. The burden then shifts to the defendant
to disprove causation. Liability is then apportioned according to the
degree of risk posed by individual defendants,
as measured by each
26
one's share of the relevant market.

Similarly, the plaintiffs in Hamilton sought to prove that the
gun manufacturers' allegedly indiscriminate marketing and
distribution practices generated an underground market in
handguns, which provided youths and criminals with easy
access to dangerous firearms, 217 and thus facilitated criminal

misuse.2 "'
It is ironic that Judge Weinstein drew a comparison between negligent marketing and mass tort lawsuits in this novel case because mass tort litigation has a dubious history.2"9
Indeed, mass tort lawsuits have been criticized for several
reasons. First, they frequently involve great variations in damages and "uncertain evidence of liability and causation."210
Defendants who are pressured into settling in the face of uncertain claims are left believing that the process is unfair.21 '
Furthermore, aggregation of a massive number of claims
through class certification can create an "all or nothing risk"
that forces companies to either settle or risk bankruptcy.212
24 Judge Weinstein specifically made this comparison in Hamilton. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. at 834.
2"5 See id.
201
27

Id. at 834-35.
See id. at 844.

208 Id.

29 See supra Introduction.
210 Report of the Advisory
2. Report of the Advisory

Committee, supra note 9, at 36.
Committee, supra note 9, at 36; see also Symposium,
supra note 9, at 338; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (1966 amendment to advisory
committee's notes).
212 On May 15, 1995, before the tobacco and gun manufacturer
litigation had
even begun, the Dow Corning Corp., holder of the largest share of the breast
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Such a risk can force defendants to settle even meritless claims
and to accept unjustifiable settlement terms.213 However, a
number of circuit courts have decertified classes in national
mass tort class action lawsuits because of the insurmountable
pressure on defendants to settle and the overly broad variations in liability and damages.214
The irony that Judge Weinstein would make a comparison
to mass tort litigation stems from the fact that the same criticisms of the validity of mass tort lawsuits apply to the negligent marketing theory that succeeded in Hamilton. The decision in Hamilton was an unprecedented expansion of existing
tort law. As mentioned, Judge Weinstein stated outright that
strict products liability theories were insufficient to hold handgun manufacturers liable for third party misuse of handguns.215 Yet, Weinstein also stated that "[u]nder New York
negligence law, duties of manufacturers parallel in many respects those imposed by strict products liability."216 Given
this interrelationship between the strict products liability and
negligence law standards, and the plaintiffs' failure to meet
the requirements for strict products liability, it would seem
that a negligence claim should also fail. Instead, Weinstein
stated that the limits of strict products liability warranted
application of "classic negligence law."217 Even though the
New York Court of Appeals has not recognized a duty of care

implant market, filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
due to burdens imposed by breast implant litigation, despite the fact that Dow
had joined a global settlement and despite the fact that to this day there has yet
to be published a single peer-reviewed study that supports the central allegation
behind the lawsuit-that silicone breast implants cause disease. See In re Dow
Coming Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Dow Coming Corp., 187
B.R. 919, 919-23 (E.D. Mich. 1995); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
21' Report of the Advisory Committee, supra note 9, at 20; see also Symposium,
supra note 9, at 338.
214 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Am.
Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1076 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
25 See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
216 Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 802, 823 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Enright
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 387, 570 N.E.2d 198, 203, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550,
555 (1991) (holding that a failure to warn claim is identical to a negligence claim)
and Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. N. Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 62, 427
N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1014 (4th Dep't 1980) (holding that in a design defect case there is
little difference between a claim in negligence and strict liability)).
21 See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 823.
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regarding marketing and distribution of non-defective but
dangerous products,21 8 Weinstein nevertheless held the handgun manufacturers liable.
The negligent marketing theory is particularly disturbing
in the context of public entity lawsuits against gun manufacturers because the use of the theory amounts to a broad, concerted effort to implement what has been called "product-category liability."219 While courts have generally rejected manufacturer liability absent a design defect in the product, 22 the
goal in the gun litigation seems to be the imposition of liability
without defect on manufacturers of socially disfavored products. 22' The plaintiffs seek to hold gun manufacturers liable
for the costs associated with gun violence without ever identifying individual victims who have been harmed by guns, individual criminals who have used guns to harm others, or individual gun manufacturers that sold the specific guns used to
cause damage. 2
This approach represents a step towards judicial acceptance of the theory that some products should never have been
distributed to begin with. Such a theory would have a number
of undesirable results. First, it would undermine any accurate
determination of variation among different manufacturers'
culpability. 2' For example, in Hamilton, the defendant gun

218

See id. at 824. The New York Court of Appeals has explained the standard:

Where a product presents an unreasonable risk of harm, notwithstanding
that it was meticulously made according to detailed plans and specifications, it is said to be defectively designed. This rule, however, is tempered by the realization that some products, for example knives, must by
their very nature be dangerous in order to be functional.
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Machinery Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479, 403
N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S. 717, 720 (1980).
219 See generally Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121.
220 See id. at 1296-97.
221 See id. at 1323.
22 Accurate determination of causation seems particularly unlikely because a
large portion of guns used in crimes are never recovered. See Hamilton, 62 F.
Supp. 2d at 843. There frequently is no "smoking gun" and thus no truly accurate
identification of which gun manufacturer sold the gun in question.
21 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121, at 1303. Henderson and Twerski
used the example of the difficulty in establishing which cigarette manufacturer
should be held liable for illness suffered by a plaintiff who had used multiple
tobacco products. See id. (citing Stein, Cigarette Products Liability Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REV. 631, 662 n.207 (1987); Note, The Great American Smokeout:
Holding Cigarette Manufacturers Liable for Failing to Provide Adequate Warnings
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manufacturers argued that the negligent marketing theory and
apportionment of liability based on each gun manufacturer's
share of the gun market failed to take into account variations
between each gun manufacturer's ratio of negligent to nonnegligent sales. 4 On its face, this argument seems eminently reasonable-finding fifteen gun manufacturers liable for
negligent marketing would seem to warrant a determination of
the ratio of negligent to non-negligent sales for each gun manufacturer. Yet, Weinstein stated:
The precise breach alleged and proved against the [gun manufacturers] was their overall policy and practice of indiscriminate marketing and distribution of handguns. Given the nature of the breach, as
found by the jury, any variations in the ratio of tortious to non-tortious sales among the negligent defendants must be regarded as
accidental and irrelevant rather than a reflection of differing degrees of culpability.'

In addition to eliminating any apportionment of liability
among gun manufacturers, acceptance of a product-category
liability theory for gun manufacturers would create the insurmountable problem of determining which products fit into the
category.226 For example, the debate over "Saturday Night
Specials" resulted in one court holding manufacturers of a
certain classification of gun liable for resulting damages. 7
"Saturday Night Specials" are generally defined as small, inexpensive, poorly manufactured, inaccurate, and unreliable lightweight handguns with short barrels that are easily concealed,
and thus ideal for criminal misuse." Yet, such a determination fails to take into account any benefit produced by such
guns-most notably the availability of an affordable means of
protection.22 9 Regardless of whether the social burden caused
by the availability of such guns outweighs the social utility, it
is virtually impossible for a court to effectively make such a
calculation." Similarly, it is impossible for a court to tackle

of the Hazards of Smoking, 27 B.C. L. REV. 1033, 1047-49 & n.118 (1986)).
2'Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
Id. at 845 (citations omitted).
2 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121, at 1305.
See Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143, 1160 (Md. 1985).
See id. at 1153-54.

See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 121, at 1306.
"

See id.
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the problem of determining which handguns, out of the thousands of different types available today, fit the "Saturday
Night Special" classification. 231 As two commentators have
noted, "To be answered rationally, the question whether handguns of a particular size and monetary price are 'good for
society' would require extended legislative or administrative
hearings and investigations."' 2
This problem grows to an unimaginable scale in public
entity lawsuits against gun manufacturers. No court can adequately address the issues of which type of firearm has a net
social utility, which manufacturer negligently markets its
guns, or what percentage of each "negligent" gun
manufacturer's sales were legitimate or negligent. Such issues
can only be properly addressed, if at all, by legislatures. Put
simply, the negligent marketing theory is a step towards product-category liability, which would be an expansion of tort law
into the province of legislatures.
C. Policy
The public entity lawsuits of the gun manufacturers are
following the same pattern as the public entity lawsuits
against the tobacco companies. For example, the proliferation
of gun violence involving youths, and, in particular, events
such as the Columbine High School shooting, have created a
general anti-gun sentiment among the public,"3 even though
gun violence as a whole has fallen off dramatically in recent
years.2 34 In addition, future settlements in the gun manufacturer litigation will likely include advertising and sales restrictions, and will likely cause increases in gun prices resulting
from increased costs to manufacturers (for compliance with
safety restrictions). 235 Similarly, the tobacco settlement in21 See id.

See id.

After the Columbine High School shooting, President Clinton proposed a
large gun control bill. See Barrett, Evolution of a Cause, supra note 194, at A19.
" There were 16,914 homicides nationwide in 1998, of which 10,975 involved
guns. This was down from 18,210 homicides in 1997, of which 12,346 involved
guns. Robberies involving guns fell to 38% of robberies nationwide in 1998, down
from 40% in 1997. Fox Butterfield, F.B.L Study Finds Gun Use In Violent Crimes
Declining, N.Y. TIMES, October 18, 1999, at A19.
'
President Clinton has indicated that the goal of the current local gun manu"

2000]

PUBLICENTITY TOBACCO AND GUN LAWSUITS

volved restrictions on advertising and sales 236 and caused cigarette price increases."
1. Coordination and Settlement Pressure
The regulations sought by the plaintiffs indicate that the
gun manufacturer litigation, like the tobacco litigation, is
based more on the use of settlement pressure to impose regulations than on legal causation and liability. The policy orientation of the lawsuits against the gun manufacturers was clear
in the events leading up to the Hamilton decision. Freddie
Hamilton, the lead plaintiff in Hamilton, was referred to her
lawyer by Barbara Holt, an anti-gun activist and member of
the all-volunteer New Yorkers Against Gun Violence organization." The plaintiffs' lawyer in Hamilton, Elisa Barnes, cited
the tobacco litigation as a guide in her suit against the gun
manufacturers. 9 Ms. Barnes, speaking on the subject of gun
litigation, said, "You don't need a legislative majority to file a
lawsuit," and "[u]ltimately it was the litigation, and the danger
of punitive damages, that brought the cigarette companies to
the table."24" Ms. Barnes found a willing participant in Judge
Weinstein, who parted with prior New York case law and held
that gun manufacturers could be found liable for negligent
marketing and distribution of guns.2 41

facturer lawsuits and threatened federal suit is to force gun manufacturers to stop
"irresponsible marketing practices" and to accept "safety design changes." Press
Conference with President Bill Clinton, Subject: Middle East and His Agenda for
Next Year, Dean Acheson Auditorium, Department of State 5 (Dec. 9, 1999), (transcript available from FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC.). [hereinafter Press Conference].
'6 See supra Part L.A.
2 On November 24, 1998, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds announced a price
increase of forty-five cents per pack to help them pay for the settlement with the
states. Skipp Wollenberg, Record Price Hike for Cigarettes, ABCNEWS.COM, Nov.
25, 1998, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/cigarettes98ll24.html (last
visited Feb. 16, 2001).
' See Barrett, Evolution of a Cause, supra note 194, at Al.
239 Id. at A19.
240 Id.
Supp. 802, 839 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Judge
241 See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F.
Weinstein is an outspoken supporter of judicial activism. In his book, Judge
Weinstein wrote, "By their very nature, these [mass tort] cases involve unanticipated problems with wide-ranging social and political ramifications. A judge does
not 'legislate from the bench' because he or she considers the broadest implications
of his or her decision in such a case. Judges not only may take such a view, they
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Although many of the municipalities and counties that
have sued the gun manufacturers based their complaints on
the negligent marketing theory that succeeded in the Hamilton
case,24 2 the main blueprint for the gun litigation was the

highly coordinated tobacco litigation. In the tobacco litigation,
a group of plaintiffs' lawyers, the Castano Group, initiated
numerous private lawsuits against the tobacco industry and
coordinated and consulted with state and federal officials on
many of the governments' tobacco lawsuits.243 In May, 1998,
Wendell Gaulthier, a founding member of the Castano Group,
called Dennis Henigan, a former corporate litigator with
Washington's Foley & Lardner who changed sides and was
hired to start the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence's litigation unit.24 This began a pattern of collaboration identical to
that in the tobacco litigation-Henigan and the Castano Group
offered to pay the costs of the cities' lawsuits against gun manufacturers in return for twenty percent of all settlements or
thirty percent of all jury awards.245 Henigan and the Castano
Group helped convince New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial to file
the first suit on behalf of a city against the gun industry.24
The plaintiffs and anti-gun groups have improved upon
the coordination that played such a large role in the tobacco
litigation. In particular, web sites such as the Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse247 not only put plaintiffs lawyers and activists nationwide in contact with one another, but also provide
a medium through which hundreds of complaints, briefs, decisions, and information on shootings or individual gun manufacturers can be exchanged.248 The site also encourages visitors

must." JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 92-3

(1995).
2"2 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at 7, Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
No. 98-CH15596 (Cook County Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 12, 1998); Brief and Separately
Bound Appendix of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp.
(Bridgeport), No. CV-99-0361279 (Conn. App. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 1999), all available
at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http://www.firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
243 See
244 See
242 See
244 See

MOLLENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, at 74.

Peter J. Boyle, Big Guns, THE NEW YORKER, May 17, 1999, at 54.
id. at 61.
id.

247http://www.firearmslitigation.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
2" See id.
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to explore whether they might be entitled to compensation
through civil litigation as a result of gun violence 249 and provides a phone number to call for referrals to attorneys.2
This level of coordination among plaintiffs far exceeds that of
the plaintiffs in the tobacco litigation. Given that less sophisticated coordination in the tobacco litigation forced a $48.7 billion (sales) industry to agree to a nation-wide settlement, the
pressure on the gun manufacturers to settle, as Smith &
Wesson already has, must be overwhelming.
The pressure now imposed upon the gun manufacturers
raises all the concerns that came to light in several national
class action mass tort lawsuits." The process of using national class action lawsuits to force settlement, regardless of
the merits of the claims involved, has been referred to as "legalized blackmail"2 5 2 because entire industries must settle
not only to minimize bad publicity,2 3 but also to avoid bankruptcy at the hands of a jury or as a result of litigation
costs.1 4 Litigating on a national scale can bankrupt companies or force them to alter their manufacturing and marketing
practices even though the manufacturers are selling non-defective, lawful products. The decision to impose regulations on
manufacturers of non-defective, lawful products is not one that
should be made by plaintiffs lawyers, activists, or "super legislature" judiciaries. Such decisions should by made by legislatures through the process of representative government.
2. Negligent Plaintiffs
Apart from the questionable tort theories and policy justifications, the public entity gun lawsuits are particularly hypocritical because many of the cities suing under theories of neg-

24 See http'//www.firearmslitigation.org/rtk.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
'o

2001).
2"

See http'//www.firearmslitigation.org/intro.html#services

(last visited Feb. 28,

See supra notes 209-213 and accompanying text.

22 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

.. Publicly owned companies have the added burden of having to worry about
share price. On the day that the Justice Department filed its suit against the
tobacco industry, shares of Philip Morris fell $1.125 to $34.50, while shares of R.J.
Reynolds fell $1.1875 to $27.3125. See David S. Cloud & Gordon Fairclough, U.S.
Sues Tobacco Makers in Massive Case, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1999, at A3.
24 See supra notes 103 & 212.
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ligent marketing and distribution have actually sold the same
guns in the same manner as the manufacturers. 5 During
the 1980s, police departments in numerous cities began the
practice of recycling their used guns into the consumer market
through trade-ins or resales.2 6 This practice saves police departments money because gun manufacturers offer the departments large discounts for trade-ins, which the manufacturers
then sell to wholesalers." 7 Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms statistics show that in 1998, at least 1,100
former police guns were among the 193,203 crime guns
In October 1998, the International Association of
traced.
Chiefs of Police enacted a resolution which stated that "recirculation of these firearms back into the general population
increases the availability of firearms which could be used
again to kill or injure additional police officers and civilians." 9
Gun manufacturers have also accepted guns seized from
crime scenes in trade-ins with municipalities. 20" New Orleans, the first city to sue the gun manufacturers, recently
recycled 7,300 guns by selling them to an Indiana broker, even
though many of the guns, including TEC-9s and other semiautomatics that have been banned from importation and manufacture since 1994, were confiscated from criminals. 261' New
Orleans' suit against the gun manufacturers demands, as part
of the remedy, that manufacturers be required to equip guns
sold with safety locks, yet no such condition was attached to
the sale of guns by New Orleans.262 Similarly, Boston recently-sold roughly 2,350 9mm pistols to gun wholesaler Interstate

" Vanessa O'Connell & Paul M. Barrett, Unloading Old Police Guns: More
Cities Ban Trade-Ins and Resales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1999, at Bi [hereinafter
O'Connell & Barrett, Unloading].
256 Id.
257Id.
258 Vanessa O'Connell & Paul M. Barrett, Ricochet: Cities Suing Gun Firms
Have a Weak Spot: They're Suppliers, Too, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1999, at Al
[hereinafter O'Connell & Barrett, Ricochet].
259 Id.
260 Id.
2. Id.; see also Walter Olson, Big Guns: Plaintiffs' Lawyers Declare Themselves
the "Fourth Branch of Government" and Go After Firearms, Lawyers Guns and
Money, at http/www.lawyersgunsandmoney.com/forthbranch-ofgovernment.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
26 Olson, supra note 261.
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Arms Corp. ("Interstate") for $324.87 each." 3 Interstate then
charged Boston $324.87 for each new .40 caliber Glock that the
city purchased." Nevertheless, Boston, in its suit against
the gun manufacturers, has alleged "willful blindness" in the
gun manufacturers' marketing and distribution practices.26
The most disturbing behavior of certain municipalities
comes in the wake of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,266 which prohibited the manufacture
of gun magazines that can hold more than ten rounds.6 7 Beginning in 1994, that restriction caused an increase in demand
for larger magazines,2 6 but did not apply to law-enforcement
agencies. Thus, wholesalers, seeing an opportunity to earn
money, made offers to police departments to trade in their
used guns, which had the larger magazines. 9 The wholesalers then re-sold the larger magazines for two to three times
their "pre-ban" value.2 7 Municipal police departments have
thus participated in the recirculation of prohibited magazines
into the civilian market.
The hypocritical nature of New Orleans' and other cities'
lawsuits is not merely a public relations matter. These municipalities are essentially gun suppliers and the gun manufacturers could defend themselves by accusing the municipalities of
negligence in distributing used police guns or seized guns.27 '
In anticipation of the problems arising from their own hypocrisy, New Orleans, Miami, St. Louis, and Bridgeport have indicated that they are considering ending the practice of recycling
police guns into the civilian market.2 72

" O'Connell & Barrett, Ricochet, supra note 258, at Al.
Id.
2" Complaint at 2, Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-25900 (Mass. Sup.
2C4

Ct. filed June 3, 1999), available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, httpi/firearmslitigation.org/decisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
2. H.R. 3355, 103rd Cong., 2d. Sess. (1994).
2G See 18 U.S.C.S. § 921(a)(31)(A) (2000).
, O'Connell & Barrett, Ricochet, supra note 258, at Al.
2 Id.
270 Id.

271 O'Connell & Barrett, Unloading, supra note 255, at Bi.
272

Id.
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3. Politics
It seems that the local governments' lawsuits against the
gun manufacturers are motivated more by the prospect of
regulating the manufacturers and generating revenue through
settlements than by a desire to redress past wrongs. In fact,
St. Louis Mayor Clarence Harmon, in a letter written in support of U.S. Senator Dick Durbin's proposed Gun Industry Accountability Act," 3 which would allow cities, counties, and
states to recover federal money spent on firearms-related medical costs, stated outright that because urban tax bases are
shrinking, cities must find new ways to recover costs for problems that could be prevented by increased industry regulation. 4
The federal government, once again, has been a late entry
into the conflict between the public entities and industries and
it has displayed great enthusiasm for using litigation to impose
regulations. Rather than just participating in settlement talks,
President Clinton has threatened a massive suit by HUD to
force gun manufacturers to accept regulating settlement
terms. 5 Recent statements give some indication as to the
Clinton Administration's motives. On December 9, 1999, President Clinton, during his press conference on the Middle East
and his agenda for the year 2000, was asked:
Sir, on another legal matter, your threat of a class action suit
against gun manufacturers, is this an attempt, sir, through either
coercion or ultimately the judicial branch to get accomplished what
you couldn't get accomplished through legislation? And with the
difficulties that you've had recently getting some of your initiatives
passed in Congress as you head into this last year of your presidency, is this the hint of a new tactic to get those initiatives passed
6
when you can't get them through Congress?.

S. 560, 106th Cong. (1999).
Knightridder News Service, Legal Battle Brewing Over Gun Violence, THE
SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 11, 1999, available at http'//www.sltrib.com/1999/mar/03111999/nation_w189702.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2001).
275 See supra notes 139-141.
26 Press Conference, supra note 235, at 4-5.
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President Clinton answered:
The litigation which is being initiated by public housing authorities
has a good grounding in fact. There are 10,000 gun crimes committed every year in the largest public housing authorities.
Now they spend a billion dollars on security. And I think it's
important that the American people know they are not asking for
money from the gun manufacturers; they are seeking a remedy to
try to help solve the problem. They want, first of all, more care in
manufacturers and the dealers with whom they deal. The second
thing they want to do is to stop irresponsible marketing practices.
And the third thing they want is some safety design changes ... so
I'm continuing to work with Congress, and I will do so vigorously.
But 7I think the-this was an appropriate thing to do on the mer-

its.

2

Presidential spokesman Joe Lockhart, speaking to reporters
before President Clinton's press conference, was more blunt
when he said, "The legislative branch certainly has enough authority [to pass laws]. Should they choose not to exercise that,
we have other ways of doing it."'78 Since the goal of tort law
is to provide plaintiffs with a means of recovering for damages
suffered, 279 President Clinton's statement reveals that the
law suits against the gun manufacturers have less to do with
recovery in tort than they do with using the judicial system to
impose regulations that are legislative in nature.
The recent dismissals of the public entity lawsuits in Cincinnati, Bridgeport, and Miami-Dade280 suggest that the gun
manufacturers should not yield to settlement pressure too
quickly. In addition, numerous state legislatures have attempted to prevent city and county lawsuits against the gun manufacturers by enacting legislation specifically drafted to prohibit
counties or municipalities from filing such lawsuits. 281' The
Id. at 5.
"' Paul M. Barrett, Gun Industry Leader Backs Clinton Bid for Pact, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 9, 1999, at B16 (alteration in original).
2" See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 41, at 5-6.
Cincinnati I, No. A99-02369 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Oct. 7, 1999); Ganim v. Smith &
Wesson Corp. (Bridgeport), No. CV-99-0361279 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999);
Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc. (Miami-Dade), No. 99-01941-CA-06 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade County Dec. 13, 1999), all available at Firearms Litigation Clearinghouse, http'//www.firearmslitigation.orgdecisions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
281 See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.155 (Michie 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-714
(1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-54-1411 (Michie 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-184
(1999); 1999 La. Acts 291; 1999 Me. Laws 430; MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-115
277
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Tennessee statute prohibiting such lawsuits, which is typical of
the statutes enacted by other states, reads as follows:
The authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearms
or ammunition manufacturer, trade association or dealer by or on
behalf of any state entity, county, municipality or metropolitan government for damages, abatement or injunctive relief resulting from
or relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing or sale of
firearms or ammunition to the public shall be reserved exclusively to
the state.282

Tennessee State Representative H.E. Bittle said, regarding
the lawsuits against the gun manufacturers, "Some of the
mayors and attorneys have figured they have another tobacco
to get a load of money out of. They'll bankrupt the legal gun
manufacturers because some criminal is violating the law.
That's totally ridiculous to me."283 Of course, New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's suit against gun manufacturers indicates that some state governments are willing to use
the judiciary to implement political policy."
The efforts of some state legislatures to block the local
government lawsuits and the recent Cincinnati and MiamiDade dismissals may strengthen the gun industry's resistance
to any kind of industry-wide settlement. Indeed, the gun manufacturers withdrew from a round of negotiations that included
the Clinton Administration and some of the municipalities that
have filed suit.285 Many gun manufacturers and wholesalers
did not want the Clinton administration to reap political gain
from involvement in settlement talks.2" 6 Even some state and
local officials feared that the Clinton Administration would
settle for a quick deal so that President Clinton could claim a
political victory in his final year of office.287 Thus, it has become quite clear that the lawsuits against the gun manufac-

(1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.107 (Michie 1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21
§ 1289.24a (1999); 1999 Pa. Laws 59; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-58-2 (Michie 1999);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1314 (1999); 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 597.
22 TENN CODE ANN. § 39-17-1314(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
2" Bonna M. de la Cruz, Bills to Block Suits Making Way Through Legislature,
THE TENNESEAN, Mar. 3, 1999, at 1.
28 See supra note 136.
25 Paul M. Barrett, Gun Industry Cancels Talks, Blocking Administration Role

in Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2000, at B2.
2856 Id.
287 Id.
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turers have little to do with any notions of substantive law,
and are nothing more than a collective attempt to use the
courts to implement regulatory policies that representatives
have failed to implement through legislation, and additionally
to generate revenues. Judge Robert F. McWeeny, in his decision dismissing Bridgeport's suit based on the city's lack of
standing, seemed to share this point of view:
When conceiving the complaint in this name, the plaintiffs must
have envisioned such settlements as the dawning of a new age of
litigation during which the gun industry, liquor industry and purveyors of "junk food" would follow the tobacco industry in reimbursing governments' expenditures and submitting to judicial regulation."8

CONCLUSION

The tobacco industry's settlements with the state attorneys
general prevented any of the states' lawsuits from being tried,
so it is unclear what precedential value, if any, can be taken
from the tobacco litigation. Most courts did not allow the
plaintiffs' main arguments-that the tobacco companies had
deceived the public about the dangers of smoking and manipulated nicotine levels to induce addiction-to proceed. Courts in
Texas and Iowa were also not receptive to the public entity
plaintiffs' antitrust, unjust enrichment, public nuisance, or
negligence claims. In addition, the dismissal of the majority of
the union fund lawsuits indicates that there is still a line of remoteness that almost no court will cross. The union fund lawsuits have largely been dismissed by federal courts, perhaps
because they seemed to have been filed only after the state
lawsuits forced the tobacco industry to agree to massive payments under the MSA.2 8 9
Although the MSA included tremendous concessions on the
part of the tobacco industry, it is also clear that it was in no

" Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp. (Bridgeport), No. 06-CV-99-01531988 at 1213, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3330, at *14 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dist. Waterbury Dec.
10, 1999).
2" The judge hearing the Bridgeport suit of the gun manufacturers referred to
the tobacco union fund lawsuits as 'me too" lawsuits-lawsuits that were only
filed by the unions to get a share of the tobacco industry's massive payments. See
id. at 13, *14.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66: 2

way an admission of guilt. In fact, the only real trial success
for plaintiffs seeking to recover from the tobacco industry has
been the Engle class action suit in Florida. In addition, although the Justice Department's suit against the tobacco industry remains unresolved, a suit of that magnitude will likely
either be dismissed, settled, or even dropped under the new
presidential administration.
Similarly, the merits of the plaintiffs' claims against the
gun manufacturers are unclear. In the context of the gun litigation, the federal courts in the White (Cleveland) and Hamilton cases have been most receptive to the plaintiffs' theories.
Those theories have had mixed receptions in the state courts.
The federal courts were more receptive to the public entities'
claims against the gun manufacturers, whereas the state
courts were more receptive to the plaintiffs' claims against the
tobacco industry.
The gun litigation differs from the tobacco litigation in two
important respects-the gun litigation has a far shorter history, and the Hamilton verdict, holding gun manufacturers liable
for negligent marketing and distribution, has preceded final
adjudication of the public entity lawsuits. Hamilton has been
used by the public entity plaintiffs as both a blueprint and
legal precedent. Yet, if the New York Court of Appeals does not
recognize the validity of the negligent marketing and distribution claim or the application of the market-share theory of
liability, then one of the public entity plaintiffs' main theories
will have been undercut.
The tobacco and gun lawsuits are very similar in an important respect-the public entity plaintiffs are highly coordinated and are thus able to bring intense settlement pressure to
bear on the defendants. In the past, mass tort litigation costs
alone have forced entire corporations to file for bankruptcy
protection."' In the tobacco litigation, the states successfully
forced settlement, in part because jury verdicts could very well
have destroyed the entire industry. The same result may be
achieved by the local governments in the gun litigation. In
addition, the burden of defending against the public entity
lawsuits, combined with the resulting public relations backlash, has made the tobacco and gun companies more vulnera29 See supra note 212.
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ble to private lawsuits. In the past, private lawsuits against
tobacco or gun manufacturers always failed, yet private plaintiffs have recently won jury verdicts against tobacco and gun
companies.
The massive awards, such as those agreed to in the MSA,
are essentially a retroactive tax imposed to recover government
expenditures, and the restrictions on marketing and distribution imposed by the MSA or the Smith & Wesson settlement
will have the same effect as would regulatory legislation. Yet,
these legislative ends effectively circumvented the traditional
process of representative government. After all, state and federal public entities have permitted the sales of cigarettes and
guns and have even taxed such sales to generate revenue. But
the public entities now seek to have courts declare that such
sales were negligent or violated strict products liability laws.
And even if the defendants, or the public, disagree with that
characterization, the defendants are forced to comply under
threat of bankruptcy. In sum, the plaintiffs' ability to use settlement pressure to recover on questionable legal grounds
illustrates the fundamental problem with public entity mass
tort lawsuits: litigation is used to achieve legislative effects.
Philip C. Patterson & JenniferM. Philpott

